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This thesis contributes to the literature on social interactions and financial decision-
making. The first essay builds on previous research that highlights how subjective
well-being deteriorates with low financial resources by showing that financial know-
ledge intensifies this relationship. More specifically, the evidence suggests that the
financially literate, with the skills and abilities to manage finances, are subject to
disproportionate deterioration in subjective well-being levels when financially dis-
tressed. In this respect, the essay suggests for public policy to consider wider
outcomes negatively influenced by financial literacy when implementing measures
to increase its overall levels in society. The second essay contributes to the eco-
nomics literature on social identity by highlighting the relationship between social
norms and mental health. It shows that individuals with highly positive views
on the welfare state and benefit recipients report a higher prevalence of mental
health problems. In societies where work is valued as a normative good, and in
which benefit recipients are characterised as benefit scroungers, expressing such
positive welfare attitudes can constitute deviations from social norms. Theoretical
analysis suggests that social sanctioning for expressing these welfare attitudes can
explain this relationship and implies that policies to destigmatise welfare can im-
prove public health. The third essay builds on evidence that rates of investment
participation are generally low and inspects the role of peers. Empirical models of
peer effects are used to quantify the contribution of the propensity to choose peers
like oneself. Contrary to what is intuitively expected, the results indicate that
the influence of peers depresses the overall participation rate. Overall, the thesis
brings to light the different mechanisms that govern social interactions and illu-
minates new dimensions to understanding financial decision-making. The findings
contribute to recent discussions on financial well-being and financial inclusion.
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Introduction
This thesis presents three essays on social interactions and financial decision-
making. This thesis’s first essay is titled “Financial Literacy and Subjective Well-
Being” and relates to the academic literature that documents a preponderance
of benefits of financial literacy. For example, financial literacy enables the better
management of planning for retirement and greater effectiveness in accumulat-
ing wealth (Klapper & Panos, 2011; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007a, 2007b, 2011);
it increases engagement with financial markets (Balloch, Nicolae & Philip, 2015;
Van Rooij, Lusardi & Alessie, 2011; Yoong, 2011); and it empowers individuals to
overcome the negative effects of economy-wide shocks (Klapper & Panos, 2013).
However, in the US context of stagnating household income growth (Piketty, Saez
& Zucman, 2018) and declining absolute income mobility (Chetty et al., 2017),
this chapter hypothesises that financial knowledge makes the lower chances of
financially distressed individuals to realise their financial aspirations in life more
apparent, thereby reducing individual subjective well-being, also known as happi-
ness or life satisfaction.
Accordingly, this first essay establishes that financial literacy can impose signific-
ant costs on the financially distressed. In this essay, financial distress is defined
as lacking the resources to meet basic consumption needs, relating to food, health
care, housing and utilities. Throughout the analysis, we draw on a representative
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survey of the US population from 2016 and show that for individuals with higher
levels of financial literacy, financial distress is strongly associated with dispropor-
tionate deterioration in subjective well-being. The relationships we observe further
intensify when individuals perceive that they are falling short of their financial
goals. This is associated with depletions in subjective well-being of 35% relative
to population-wide baseline levels. The findings suggest that a failure to achieve
greater financial aspirations that come with financial literacy can be strongly det-
rimental to individual well-being. Our findings imply important considerations for
financial education programmes when employed for poverty alleviation, as deteri-
orations in subjective well-being that can arise from higher financial knowledge
may influence individual motivations to better their circumstances.
This thesis’s second essay is titled “Social Norm Enforcement and Mental Health”.
Therein, we add to the body of research that shows the influence of individual
characteristics, circumstances and wider economic conditions on mental health
(Bridges & Disney, 2010; Currie, Duque & Garfinkel, 2015; Gathergood, 2012;
Grip, Lindeboom & Montizaan, 2011). We do so by investigating the effect of
social norm enforcement (Bernhard, Fehr & Fischbacher, 2006; Goette, Huffman &
Meier, 2006) on mental health. As Posner (1997) notes: “Norms are also enforced
by expressions of disapproval, by ridicule, and in extreme cases, by ostracism. The
efficacy of the milder ‘sanctions’ lies in their implicit threat of ostracism, that is,
of refusal of advantageous transactions.” (p. 366) This essay therefore investigates
the potential psychological repercussions these enforcement means can have and
asks whether the enforcement of social norms harm mental health.
This essay, then, provides evidence that deviating from social norms can indeed
harm mental health. In societies that assign a normative value to work (entailing
prescriptions such as“you should work” or “life means standing on your own two
feet”), expressing positive attitudes to the welfare state or benefit recipients (such
2
as “the government should spend more money on benefit”) can constitute a devi-
ation from social norms that prevail in society. Thus, such expressions can result
in social sanctioning, which can induce deterioration in mental health. Using a
set of representative surveys that measure such welfare attitudes in the British
population, we show that more positive attitudes are strongly associated with a
higher prevalence of mental health problems. In order to provide evidence on the
mechanism of social norm enforcement, we exploit changes in the UK’s political
parties elected into office and show that the relation intensifies under conservative
governments, known to be tough on welfare. Such changes in political environ-
ments can increase the degree of social sanctioning of positive welfare attitudes
by reducing its costs. Further, we find that the relationship is more pronounced
for women than for men, especially under conservative rule. Our findings suggest
a real societal cost to deviating from mainstream social norms and imply that
destigmatising welfare receipt in societies in which engaging in paid employment
is a social norm can function as a policy measure to improve public health.
This thesis’s third essay is titled “Endogenous Peer Choice and Investment Par-
ticipation”. The motivation for this third essays lies in the findings that societal
differences in financial inclusion have significant implications for wealth inequality
(Favilukis, 2013), as well as labour market and economy-wide stability (Epstein &
Shapiro, 2020). As individuals with greater incomes and education are more likely
to marry one another (Nakosteen, Westerlund & Zimmer, 2004) and, at the same
time, are more optimistic about future macroeconomic conditions (Das, Kuhnen
& Nagel, 2020), the possibility exists that financial behaviours that build wealth,
such as the use of investment products, perpetuate differently in groups of soci-
eties with homogeneous intra-group characteristics, with subsequent differential
impacts on financial inclusion.
Accordingly, the third essay in this thesis studies how the endogenous choice of
3
peers affects investment participation through the social interactions channel. We
use data from the UK’s Understanding Society and British Household Panel Sur-
vey to uncover expansive household networks. By observing with whom respond-
ents live throughout the sample period, we are able to obtain precise measurements
of individual characteristics and social ties. We find that peer choice accounts for
approximately 25% of the social interactions channel of investment participation.
We provide evidence that this finding arises from significant tendencies of indi-
viduals to choose peers similar to themselves. In a counterfactual exercise, we
shut down the peer effect in our Bayesian econometric model and observe that
investment participation increases by up to 2.5%, suggesting that non-invested in-
dividuals reinforce their inclinations of non-participation among themselves. The
results of this essay call for further policy efforts to promote the known benefits
of investments for wealth accumulation in the cross-section of society that holds
none, in order to counteract the self-sustaining group tendencies of not investing.
From here on, the thesis proceeds by presenting the essay “Financial Literacy
and Subjective Well-Being” in Chapter 1, “Social Norm Enforcement and Mental
Health” in Chapter 2 and “Endogenous Peer Choice and Investment Participation”






∗ Financial distress is associated with an approximately 13% drop in aggregate sub-
jective well-being (SWB) against predicted population-wide levels obtained from the
empirical model. The relationship between financial distress and SWB intensifies for
high financial knowledge individuals. For instance, for the highly knowledgeable, fin-
ancial distress is associated with a drop of 18% in aggregate SWB versus predicted
overall levels.
∗ When high financial knowledge individuals report that they fail to follow through
with their own financial goals, the relationship intensifies further to a drop of 35%
in aggregate subjective well-being. Controlling for a wide range of individual- and
household-level characteristics, this suggests the presence of higher financial aspira-
tions for these individuals.
∗ These results can be interpreted through the lens of reference-dependent preferences,
such that the decision to invest in the acquisition of financial knowledge was taken
given prospects of greater financial well-being. Financial distress is then evaluated




People may adapt to misery and hardship, and cease to see it for what
it is. People do not necessarily perceive the constraints caused by their
lack of freedom; the child who is potentially a great musician but never
has a chance to find out will not express a lack of life satisfaction.
Whole groups can be taught that their poor health or their lack of
political participation are natural or even desirable aspects of a good
world. (Deaton, 2008, p. 69)
Recent years have brought sobering developments to the financial prospects of US
households. Income growth has stagnated from 1980 to 2014 for the bottom 50%
(Piketty et al., 2018); 90% of children born in 1940 earn more than parents versus
50% in 1980 (Chetty et al., 2017). Households financial distress is prevalent, with
approximately 40% of households experiencing one or more lack of basic consump-
tion necessities (Karpman, Zuckerman & Gonzalez, 2018). At the same time, in
the last two decades, happiness and life satisfaction in the US have consistently
declined (Helliwell, Layard & Sachs, 2019). Given the well-documented finding
in the literature that lower incomes are related to decreased subjective well-being
(Deaton, 2008; Kahneman & Deaton, 2010; Sacks, Stevenson & Wolfers, 2012),
we investigate the role of financial literacy in this context. In particular, we ask:
does higher financial literacy decrease individual life satisfaction in the face of
adverse financial circumstances, as the lower chances of realising one’s financial
aspirations in life are felt more acutely?
Specifically, we investigate whether greater financial knowledge is associated with
lower subjective well-being, popularly referred to as happiness or satisfaction, for
individuals facing financial distress. We propose that higher levels of financial
knowledge can further erode subjective well-being when struggling to pay bills
and everyday expenses, as greater financial knowledge could have been acquired
6
1.1. Introduction
in response to higher financial aspirations in individuals. Financial distress then
results in a widened gap between desired financial prospects and the actual realities
of the individual financial situation, thereby disproportionally eroding individuals’
life satisfaction, as well as wider dimensions of how respondents evaluate their
lives.1
Studying these relationships, our analyses draw on rich cross-sectional data repres-
entative of the US adult population, obtained from the 2016 National Financial
Well-Being Survey fielded and made available by the Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau (2017). The data elicit in detail respondents’ levels of subjective
well-being, financial literacy and financial distress, as well as a preponderance
of demographic characteristics. Our main outcome variables relate to subjective
well-being. Three survey questions measure the subjective well-being dimensions
of 1) life satisfaction, 2) optimism about the future and 3) the belief that work
yields success. Respondents convey their answers on a 7-point Likert scale, which
for construction of an aggregate scale, we map to the integers from 0 to 6, where
greater values indicate higher levels of well-being. For each respondent, we sum all
three answers and thus obtain the aggregate subjective well-being score, ranging
from 0 to 18. Our main explanatory variable of interest is the financial knowledge
score by Knoll and Houts (2012), a composite measure capturing respondents’
understanding of a wide range of financial concepts. We further construct an in-
dicator variable capturing financial distress in the last 12 months from questions
about experiences of worrying about running out of food or actually doing so;
being unable to afford medical treatment; and not being able to afford housing
or paying for utilities. Financial distress is then defined as answering “often” or
“sometimes” to at least one of these questions. Further, we construct variables
capturing the respondents’ marital status, health, education, financial depend-
1This is mechanism is consistent with the recent research that distinguishes two aspects
of subjective well-being. Kahneman and Deaton (2010), for instance, show that high income
improves evaluation of life but not emotional well-being.
7
1.1. Introduction
ants, age, gender and household income for inclusion as controls in our empirical
analysis. Exact variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Our analysis
sample contains 6394 observations.
In our empirical analysis, we first estimate multivariate linear and ordered probit
regressions that establish the baseline that experiences of financial distress are
associated with decreased aggregate subjective well-being levels of approximately
13% versus predicted overall levels, the average of the model-fitted subjective well-
being levels of respondents. The next step involves separating respondents by high
(low) financial knowledge levels, defined as scores greater (lower) than the sample
average, which reveals substantial heterogeneity across financial knowledge levels:
the negative association changes to -18% and -11%, respectively, for the high and
low financial knowledge group. The effects are found to be statistically different.
Importantly, these associations are stable across all individual dimensions of sub-
jective well-being: life satisfaction, optimism about the future and the belief that
work today yields success in the future. All these measures deplete more strongly
for high financial knowledge individuals in financial distress.
Next, we test for evidence that greater financial aspirations can provide an ex-
planation for the negative relation between financial knowledge and subjective
well-being for financially distressed individuals. To do so, we rely on two sur-
vey questions that elicit how well respondents feel that the statements “I follow-
through on financial goals I set for myself” and “I follow-through on my financial
commitments to others”, respectively, apply to themselves. The possible answer
choices are on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “completely” to “not at all”. To
identify greater financial aspirations, we derive two further variables that capture
which respondents indicate that the respective statements apply “not at all” or
“very little”. Ceteris paribus, controlling a wide range of important individual
characteristics, failing to meet one’s own financial goals is indicative of these goals
8
1.1. Introduction
being greater to begin with. Analogous reasoning applies to financial commitments
towards others, and together these variables capture internal (towards oneself) and
external (towards others) dimensions of financial aspirations.
Then, to test the notion that financial aspirations can help explain why high fin-
ancial knowledge intensifies experiences of financial distress, we regress subjective
well-being levels on the interaction between the high/low financial knowledge in-
dicator and the variables capturing internal and external dimensions of financial
aspirations, respectively. Two important observations emerge from this analysis.
First, our findings reveal that for the highly financially literate, failure to meet
internal financial aspirations is associated with a decrease in aggregate subjective
well-being of 35% against population-wide baseline levels – an approximately two-
fold increase relative to the baseline estimate regarding the mediating role of finan-
cial knowledge. All these associations are highly statistically significant, vis-a-vis
the baseline where high financial knowledge individuals do not fail to meet their
internal aspirations. Second, in the case of external financial aspirations, failure
to follow through does not intensify the relationship between financial knowledge,
as indicated by p-values consistently greater than 0.1 for the corresponding tests.
In a set of additional analyses, we address endogeneity concerns relating to poten-
tially omitted drivers introducing bias in the observed relationships. First, we em-
ploy an instrumental variable approach using the method by Lewbel (2012). The
results corroborate the conclusions drawn in our empirical analysis that financial
distress disproportionally decreases subjective well-being levels for the highly fin-
ancially literate. To reduce potential biases in estimating the association between
financial knowledge and subjective well-being stemming from the endogenous ac-
quisition of financial knowledge (Lusardi, Michaud & Mitchell, 2017), we further
use a sample obtained through a standard propensity score matching approach,
balancing respondents’ covariates across high and low levels of financial know-
9
1.2. Related Literature
ledge. We test the stability of our baseline results and the proposed mechanism
and corroborate the conclusions drawn in the empirical analysis for the case of
individual life satisfaction. Confirming that the observed associations hold in this
group of respondents is crucially important, as respondents outside of financial dis-
tress will be significantly less likely to select into financial education programmes
designed for poverty alleviation. In this way, we directly establish the relevance
of our findings for financial educators who likely will be in close contact with such
individuals and may consider the implications of the associations we uncover for
curriculum design.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 discusses related literature. Sec-
tion 1.3 describes our data and variables; Section 1.4 presents the results of our
empirical analysis; Sections 1.5 and 1.6 provide the results of our additional ana-
lyses; Section 1.7 discusses the limitations of this study and possibilities for future
research, while Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Subjective well-being is distinguished into a component that represents life evalu-
ation (how well am I doing in life generally) and another that captures emotional
well-being (how pleasant my day-to-day experiences are) (Deaton, 2008; Kahne-
man & Deaton, 2010). This distinction is particularly pertinent for the study
of income on subjective well-being: while income consistently affects one’s evalu-
ation of life, emotional well-being is only influenced to a certain income threshold
($75,000 in the US), and then tapers off with further income increases (Kahne-
man & Deaton, 2010). This thesis chapter contributes to the determinants of




By now, a large literature exists that documents a positive relationship between in-
come and wealth on the one hand, and subjective well-being on the other (Deaton,
2008; Sacks et al., 2012). One study serves particularly well to illustrate important
findings of this literature: Sacks et al. (2012) show in their re-examination of pre-
vious studies using comprehensive global data on subjective well-being that richer
individuals report greater subjective well-being than poorer ones; richer countries
have higher individual subjective well-being than poorer ones; economic growth
is related to rising well-being; there is no satiation point of subjective well-being
with respect to income; and the magnitude of these relationships, whatever the
domain, are approximately equal. The recent influential study by Lindqvist, Öst-
ling and Cesarini (2020) suggests that the main mediator of sustained increases in
subjective well-being from higher incomes arises from greater financial satisfaction.
In contrast to financial knowledge, an important mediating characteristic between
income and subjective well-being that is difficult to influence through policy meas-
ures is brought to light in the findings of Grace, Lee, Sirgy and Bosnjak (2019),
who show that happiness materialism – understood as the belief that higher in-
comes lead to greater happiness – is associated with lower subjective well-being
levels as income rises. They empirically test, and find evidence in favour of, the
explanation that the moderating effect arises from happiness materialism indu-
cing greater frequencies with which individuals evaluate their standard of living.
Resulting from this, individuals, to their detriment, compare their actual financial
circumstances with idealised, unattainable ones, which then leads to lower levels of
subjective well-being. This thesis chapter relates to the idea that financial aspir-
ations encapsulate desired standards of living. It is intuitive that reference points
and financial aspirations are closely linked, as aspirations by definition imply a
desired but unfulfilled state of existence. Financial aspirations thus constitute
another mediator intractable to policymakers in the income and subjective well-
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being relationship, studied in the context of developing economies and proposed
as a mechanism explaining deteriorations in subjective well-being as income rises
(Graham & Pettinato, 2002).
This thesis chapter is further related to the literature on financial literacy. Stud-
ies therein have uncovered a host of benefits of being financially literate. For
instance, the financially literate are more likely to participate in financial markets
(Balloch et al., 2015; Van Rooij et al., 2011; Yoong, 2011), fare better in response
to aggregate shocks (Klapper & Panos, 2013) and are better at detecting fraud in
their financial accounts (Engels, Kumar & Philip, 2020). However, of particular
interest in the context of this thesis chapter is the financial literacy literature on
retirement planning (Klapper & Panos, 2011; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007a, 2007b).
Planning inherently involves expectation formation and entails the possibility of
disappointment. This literature indicates potential avenues in which financial as-
pirations can operate when influencing individual reference points. While planning
means maximising the likelihood of aspirations materialising in the future, epis-
odes of financial distress can make their fulfilment appear more and more unlikely,
thereby deteriorating life satisfaction and happiness.
1.3 Data and variables
We use the rich cross-sectional data from the National Financial Well-Being Sur-
vey, made publicly available by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2017).
The responses were collected in 2016, and the data are representative of the US
adult population. The data contain detailed information on the respondents’ levels
of subjective well-being, financial literacy and financial distress, as well as their
demographic characteristics, incomes and childhood background variables. Engels
et al. (2020) use this data set to study the effect of financial literacy on fraud de-
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tection, and some definitions of control variables used in this article overlap with
those used in their study. The total survey contains responses of 6394 individuals,
and we use all respondent observations in our analyses.
1.3.1 Subjective well-being
Our main outcome variables relate to subjective well-being. Respondents are
invited to state how well a set of subjective well-being statements apply to them-
selves. These include “I am satisfied with my life”, “I am optimistic about my
future” and “If I work hard today, I will be more successful in the future”.
The available answers lie on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree”
to “strongly agree”. To construct an aggregate subjective well-being variable, we
map the supplied assessments to the integers from 0 to 6, where greater values
indicate higher levels of well-being. For each respondent, we sum all three answers
to obtain an aggregate subjective well-being score, ranging from 0 to 18.
1.3.2 Financial knowledge
To make financial literacy operational in our analyses, we employ the respondents’
financial knowledge as our explanatory variable of interest. We utilise the financial
knowledge score by Knoll and Houts (2012) that is provided in the data. The Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau (2017) derives the score from a two-parameter
item response model using nine survey questions that test the respondents’ un-
derstanding of a wide range of financial concepts. The financial knowledge ques-
tions used relate to 1) savings accounts, bonds and stock return characteristics,
2) savings accounts, bonds and stock risk characteristics, 3) risk diversification,
4) possibilities of stock market losses, 5) life insurance savings features, 6) house
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price losses, 7) credit card repayments, 8) the relation between interest rates and
bond prices and 9) the relation between mortgage term and interest.
Based on a set of binary variables, one for each question, indicating whether re-
spondents supplied the correct answer to the respective question, financial know-
ledge scores using the item response model are estimated, jointly with parameters
allowing for the various questions’ differing levels of difficulty and discriminat-
ory power. Estimates are obtained through Maximum Likelihood Estimation, in
which respondents’ financial knowledge scores are assumed to follow a standard
normal distribution (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2017). Therefore,
financial knowledge can be thought of in terms of z-scores: a respondent with
average financial knowledge receives a score of zero, while all other scores can be
interpreted as distances from the financial knowledge average, normalized by the
financial knowledge standard deviation.
1.3.3 Financial distress
The survey captures self-assessments of respondents regarding how frequently they
have experienced adverse financial states in the last 12 months, indicative of severe
financial distress. Specifically, questions that were asked capture whether 1) the
respondent worried food might run out before having money to buy more, 2)
whether any household member couldn’t afford to see a doctor or to go to a
hospital, 3) food didn’t last, and there wasn’t any money to get more, 4) any
household member stopped or reduced medication due to cost, 5) the respondent
couldn’t afford a place to live and 6) utilities were shut off due to non-payment.
The exact question wordings are reported in the Appendix.
Possible answers to these question include “often”, “sometimes” and “never”, in
addition to an option of declining to provide an answer. We construct an indicator
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variable that takes the value one if respondents choose “often” or “sometimes” in
response to at least one experience of financial distress, and zero otherwise. This
variable constitutes our key variable indicating respondent-level financial distress.
1.3.4 Summary statistics
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for our baseline data sample. The columns
show the mean, minimum, maximum, standard deviation and number of observa-
tions for each variable used. The variables not discussed in the preceding sections
are self-explanatory, though detailed variable definitions are provided in the Ap-
pendix.
Inspecting the summary statistics reveals that subjective well-being levels appear
high: the mean of aggregate subjective well-being equals 13.30, corresponding
to 74% of the maximum attainable score of 18. For the subjective well-being
questions “Satisfied with my life”, “Optimistic about my future” and “Work hard
today, successful in future” the mean values correspond to 4.39 (73% of maximum),
4.42 (74%) and 4.50 (75%), respectively.
Turning to financial knowledge, the values of its summary statistics reflect the
standard normal parametric specification of the scores. The mean of the respond-
ents’ estimated financial knowledge scores is −0.028, with a standard deviation of
0.80 and a range from −2.05 to 1.27.
The financial distress indicator variable reveals that approximately 29% of re-
spondents experienced an adverse financial state indicative of severe financial dis-
tress in the last 12 months. This is consistent with 2017 population estimates
suggesting that a large part of the US population is subject to financial distress
(Karpman et al., 2018).
With respect to other demographic and financial characteristics that enter our em-
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pirical analysis as control variables, the summary statistics reveal that the majority
of respondents is married or lives with their partner (66%) and has good health
(85%). Slightly more than one-third of respondents have completed university
education (38%) and a similar fraction report not being financially responsible for
any dependent children (34%). The mean respondent age is 51.26; approximately




We begin our analysis with a visual inspection of the relationship between financial
distress, financial knowledge and subjective well-being in Figure 1.1 and provide
the results from statistical difference testing in Table 1.2. Figure 1.1 shows the
proportions of individuals with subjective well-being greater than the sample av-
erage. For the purpose of these investigations, the ordered variables retain their
mapping to the integers 0 to 6. Panel (a) shows the values for aggregate subject-
ive well-being; Panel (b) for the dimension “Satisfied with my life”; Panel (c) for
“Optimistic about my future”; and Panel (d) for “Work hard today, successful in
the future”. The horizontal axis separates individuals by their levels of financial
knowledge. Financial knowledge is defined as low (high) for scores below (above)
the sample average. The white and grey bars indicate proportions for individuals
without and with recent experiences of financial distress, respectively.
Three observations summarise the figure characteristics. First, across Panels (a) to
(d) and financial knowledge levels, reports of financial distress are associated with
lower subjective well-being levels. The aggregate subjective well-being score, in
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particular, reveals a stark difference between well-being levels inside and outside of
financial distress. Second, for respondents in financial distress, a visible difference
in subjective well-being can be noted when comparing the proportions for low
and high financial respondents: across all panels, subjective well-being levels are
lower for high financial knowledge individuals. Third, in particular for aggregate
subjective well-being levels, financial knowledge levels do not appear to be strongly
related to to subjective well-being levels.
In Table 1.2, we further inspect the subsample of respondents in financial distress
and test for the univariate statistical significance of differences in subjective well-
being levels across low and high financial knowledge levels. Specifically, the table
reports mean values that capture the proportions of respondents with subjective
well-being greater than the sample average along the respective dimensions. The
columns are split by financial knowledge levels, reporting the respective respondent
counts and means. The final set of columns shows the difference in proportions
(∆) between low and high financial knowledge levels, in addition to t-tests for the
statistical significance in the differences in means. Overall, the t-tests indicate
that the null hypothesis of equality in means across financial knowledge levels
is strongly rejected, with the high financially literate exhibiting lower subjective
well-being levels across all measured dimensions.
1.4.2 Financial distress and subjective well-being
We begin by establishing the magnitude of the relationship between financial dis-
tress and subjective well-being, controlling for a wide range of potential confound-
ing influences. In this way, we establish a baseline for our sample of respondents to
judge the size of the moderating effect of financial knowledge explored in the later
sections. Though it is known that economic hardships influence subjective well-
being (Reeskens & Vandecasteele, 2017), the granularity of individual experiences
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captured by our financial distress variable, as well as the breadth of subjective
well-being dimensions in our data, will allow for a more precise measurement of
the association.
We do so by first examining the relationship between financial distress (FinDistress)
and aggregate subjective well-being (SubjWellBeing) in an ordinary least squares
(OLS) framework:
SubjWellBeingi = α + γ(FinDistressi) +X
′
iθ + εi, (1.1)
where i denotes the individual-level identifier. The financial distress variable takes
the value one if respondents indicate experiencing any financial distress in the last
12 months. The vector of controls, X, captures important covariates, namely
whether respondents are married or cohabiting, have good health, University
education, no children to financially support, as well as the respondents’ ages,
genders and household incomes. Detailed variable descriptions are provided in the
Appendix. Robust standard errors control for arbitrary heteroskedasticity of the
error term. The parameter γ in Equation (1.1) captures the association of interest.
The variables capturing the individual dimensions of subjective well-being can take
ordered values form “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” on a 7-point scale. In
order to account for the limited-dependent variable nature of these variables, we
employ an ordered probit estimation methodology. The regression equation takes
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d + γd(FinDistressi) +X
′
iθ
d + εi (1.3)
g(p∗i ) =

“Strongly disagree” if −∞ < p∗i ≤ c1
...
“Strongly agree” if c6 < p∗i <∞
(1.4)
where the superscript d indicates the different subjective well-being variables. Spe-
cifically, the dependent variable in Equation (1.2) is either the respondents’ degree
of agreement with the statements “I am satisfied with my life”, “I am optimistic
about my future” or “If I work hard today, I will be more successful in future”,
respectively. The function g(·) in Equation (1.4) is the ordered probit link (Rood-
man, 2011), mapping the latent subjective well-being propensities in Equation
(1.3), p∗i , to the observed outcomes. The cutoff points c1 to c6 are quantities to be
estimated. The regression error term, εi follows a standard normal distribution in
accordance with the ordered probit normalisation assumption. The remainder of
the regression setup follows Equation (1.1).
Table 1.3 reports the estimation results. Column (1) shows the results for aggreg-
ate subjective well-being, while Columns (2) to (4) show those for the respective
individual dimensions of subjective well-being. Column (1) reports OLS para-
meter estimates; by contrast, Columns (2) to (4) show ordered probit coefficient
estimates. We observe that in aggregate, being in financial distress is associated
with a highly significant decrease in subjective well-being of 1.735 points on the
aggregate subjective well-being scale. The average subjective well-being levels
predicted from Equation (1.1) equal 13.298, which implies that financial distress
is associated with deterioration in subjective well-being levels of -1.735/13.298 =
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-0.130 or, equivalently, -13%.
Regarding the individual subjective well-being dimensions, the probit coefficient
estimates indicate that the greatest association (-0.560) is observed for the life sat-
isfaction measure, followed by those capturing optimism about the future (-0.403)
and the belief that working hard today, will increase chances of future success
(-0.297). All estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. In order to
provide economic significance regarding these estimates, we compute the average
marginal effects for the ordered probit outcome “strongly agree”. In all cases, we
observe that respondents in financial distress become less likely to report strong
agreement, for which the corresponding AMEs are -0.161, -0.124 and -0.101, imply-
ing a reduction in the probability to strongly agree with the respective subjective
well-being statements of 16.1, 12.4 and 10.1 percentage points, respectively, with
significance at the 1% level throughout.
The associations of the control variables with subjective well-being are intuitive.
Respondents who are married or live with their partner report greater subjective
well-being, as do those with good health, no children to financially support and
higher household incomes. The relations between age and being female, respect-
ively, to subjective well-being are mixed, while having completed a University
education infers no relationship of statistical significance at the 10% level with
subjective well-being.
Overall, we conclude that the relationship between financial distress and subjective
well-being, in aggregate and with respect to its individual dimensions, is econom-
ically meaningful and statistically significant in our sample of US respondents.
These findings are consistent with those by Reeskens and Vandecasteele (2017).
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1.4.3 The mediating role of financial knowledge
Having quantified the relationship between financial distress and subjective well-
being in our sample of US respondents, we now turn our investigation to testing
for the mediating role of financial knowledge while controlling for a preponderance
of individual- and household-level confounding influences. Presupposing that fin-
ancial knowledge does indeed mediate the association between financial distress
and subjective well-being, given the descriptive evidence presented above, the
magnitude and significance of the relationship remains an empirical question.
To test for the existence and the nature of the mediating role of financial know-
ledge with respect to aggregate subjective well-being, we modify the regression
framework of Equation (1.1) to include the interaction of financial distress with
an indicator variable capturing financial knowledge levels greater than the sample
average:
SubjWellBeingi = α + γ1(HighFinKnowi) + γ2(FinDistressi)
+ γ3(FinDistressi ×HighFinKnowi)
+X ′iθ + εi, (1.5)
The financial distress variable (FinDistress) again takes the value one if respond-
ents report having experienced any financial distress in the last 12 months. Fin-
ancial knowledge is measured through scale by Knoll and Houts (2012), and the
high financial knowledge variable (HighFinKnow) takes the value one for scores
greater than the sample average, and zero otherwise. The remainder of the spe-
cification stays unaltered.
To also account, in this context, for the limited-dependent variable nature of the
respondent’s degree of agreement with the statements “I am satisfied with my
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life”, “I am optimistic about my future” or “If I work hard today, I will be more
successful in future”, respectively, we again adopt an ordered probit regression










d + εi (1.7)
where the superscript d indicates the different subjective well-being variables. Spe-
cifically, the dependent variable in Equation (1.6) is either the variable capturing
the respondents’ degree of agreement with the statements “I am satisfied with
my life”, “I am optimistic about my future” or “If I work hard today, I will be
more successful in future”, respectively. The function g(·) is the ordered probit
link introduced in Equation (1.4). The regression error term, εi follows a standard
normal distribution in accordance with the ordered probit normalisation assump-
tion. The remainder of the regression setup follows Equations (1.2) and (1.3).
Table 1.4 displays the relevant coefficient estimates. Column (1) shows OLS coef-
ficient estimates for aggregate subjective well-being; whereas Columns (2) to (4)
show ordered probit estimates for the respective individual dimensions of subject-
ive well-being. Two findings stand out. First, high financial knowledge individuals
outside of financial distress do not exhibit lower, strongly significant subjective
well-being levels than the base group of respondents with no financial distress
and low levels of financial knowledge. Second, across all measures of subjective
well-being, respondents that are in financial distress show strongly significant de-
teriorations in their subjective well-being levels if their financial knowledge levels
are high. In all cases, the point estimates for those with low financial knowledge
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(γ2) are lower than those with high levels (γ3). The reported results of Wald tests
for coefficient equality (H0 : γ2 = γ3) reject the null hypothesis that the associ-
ation between financial distress and subjective well-being is constant across groups
of individuals with low and high financial knowledge.
To assign an economic interpretation to the ordered probit estimation results,
Figure 1.2 reports the high financial knowledge average marginal effects (AMEs)
for individuals inside of financial distress (solid line) and outside of it (dashed line),
together with their 95% confidence intervals. Each panel indicates the results for
one individual dimension of subjective well-being. The horizontal axis shows the
corresponding ordered probit outcome, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree), to which the estimates refer.
It stands out that the high financial knowledge AMEs for individuals not in fin-
ancial distress are economically negligible and largely statistically insignificant.
However, the estimates for individuals in financial distress reveal a starkly dif-
ferent picture: across subjective well-being measures, outcomes associated with
positive subjective well-being become less likely, as indicated by negative AMEs,
while those for negative subjective well-being states become more likely. In terms
of economic magnitudes, Panel (a) shows that the probabilities with respect to
high subjective well-being outcomes 5 to 7 decrease jointly by approximately 11
percentage points. The non-overlapping confidence intervals between individuals
inside and outside of financial distress indicate that the differences in economic
magnitudes of the relationship between financial knowledge and subjective well-
being differ in in strongly significant ways across financial distress states.
The findings of this section establish strong evidence for a mediating role of finan-
cial knowledge in the relationship between financial distress and subjective well-
being. Subjective well-being deteriorates more severely for respondents with high
financial knowledge when they face financial distress across all considered meas-
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ures of subjective well-being. In this way, we provide first evidence on a financial
knowledge channel in the relationship between a lack of financial resources and
deteriorations in subjective well-being (Deaton, 2008; Kahneman & Deaton, 2010).
1.4.4 The mechanism of internal and external financial
aspirations
The previous section establishes a strongly negative association between financial
knowledge and subjective well-being for individuals in financial distress; however,
it remains silent on deeper mechanisms underlying this relationship. In this sec-
tion, we explore one possible mechanism. This includes tests for the possibilities
that financial knowledge influences the degrees of internal and external financial
aspirations felt by individuals, namely the following through on individual financial
goals (internal dimension) or the meeting of financial commitments towards others
(external dimension). For illustration, individuals with greater financial knowledge
may have greater personal financial aspirations, so that if they face hardships,
ceteris paribus, the gap between the actual and desired reality is greater, leading
to a stronger deterioration of subjective well-being. Similarly, financial knowledge
can induce a greater sense of aspiring to meet financial responsibilities towards
others that the presence of financial distress makes more difficult to attain.
To test this mechanism of financial aspirations, we rely on two questions in the
2016 National Financial Well-Being Survey that elicit how well respondents feel
that the statements “I follow-through on my financial commitments to others”
and “ I follow-through on financial goals I set for myself”, respectively, apply to
themselves. The possible answer choices to each statement are “completely”, “very
well”, “somewhat”, “very little” and “not at all”. We derive two further variables,
one from each statement, that take the value one if respondents respond with “not
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at all” or “very little”, and zero otherwise. By fixing the frequency with which
respondents follow through on their financial goals and commitments to infrequent
levels, in our analysis that controls the specific respondent characteristics, we likely
capture the strength or degrees that respondents feel with respect to these internal
and external dimensions of financial aspirations.
To test this notion empirically, beginning with aggregate subjective well-being,
we modify the regression framework described via Equation (1.5) to include the
triple interaction of financial distress, high financial knowledge and our constructed
measures of financial aspiration:
SubjWellBeingi = α + γ1(Aspirationi) + γ2(HighFinKnowi)
+ γ3(HighFinKnowi × Aspirationi) + γ4(FinDistressi)
+ γ5(FinDistressi × Aspirationi)
+ γ6(FinDistressi ×HighFinKnowi)
+ γ7(FinDistressi ×HighFinKnowi × Aspirationi)
+X ′iθ + εi, (1.8)
where the financial aspirations variable (Aspiration) is equal to either the derived
variable “Cannot meet financial goals” or “Cannot meet financial commitments”
described above. The financial distress variable (FinDistress) takes the value
one if respondents report having experienced any financial distress in the last 12
months. Financial knowledge is measured through the scale by Knoll and Houts
(2012), and the high financial knowledge variable (HighFinKnow) takes the value
one for scores greater than the sample average, and zero otherwise. The remainder
of the specification stays unaltered.
For the variables “I am satisfied with my life”, “I am optimistic about my future”
or “If I work hard today, I will be more successful in future”, respectively, we again
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+ γd3(HighFinKnowi × Aspirationi) + γd4(FinDistressi)
+ γd5(FinDistressi × Aspirationi)
+ γd6(FinDistressi ×HighFinKnowi)
+ γd7(FinDistressi ×HighFinKnowi × Aspirationi)
+X ′iθ
d + εi, (1.10)
where the superscript d indicates the different subjective well-being variables. The
function g(·) is again the ordered probit link introduced in Equation (1.4). The
regression error term, εi, follows a standard normal distribution in accordance with
the ordered probit normalisation assumption. The remainder of the regression
setup follows Equation (1.2).
Table 1.5 reports the estimation results. Column (1) shows the OLS estimation
results for aggregate subjective well-being, while Columns (2) to (4) show the
ordered probit results for the respective individual dimensions of subjective well-
being. Panel A shows those for the financial aspiration variable “Cannot meet
financial goals”, while Panel B shows those for “Cannot meet financial commit-
ments others”. In Panel A, the effect of the triple interaction on subjective well-
being when the financial aspiration variable is equal to zero (γ6) is negative and
strongly significant across all subjective well-being measures. However, the effect
more than doubles when respondents report an inability to follow through with
their own financial goals (γ7). The reported results of Wald tests for coefficient
equality (H0 : γ6 = γ7) reject the null hypothesis that the association between
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financial distress and subjective well-being is constant across high financial know-
ledge individuals with differing levels of personal financial aspirations. In contrast,
conducting the analogous Wald tests for the results in Panel B reveals that the
observed differences in coefficients therein are not statistically significant at the
10% level.
Figure 1.3 shows the financial aspirations average marginal effects (AME) for each
ordered probit regression outcome. Panel (a) to (c) display the results for the
variables “Satisfied with my life”, “Optimistic about my future” and “Work hard
today, succeed in future,” respectively. The AMEs are calculated for the subsample
of high financial knowledge respondents in financial distress. The white and grey
bars, respectively, refer to financial aspirations relating to own financial goals and
financial commitments towards others. Three observations stand out.
First, the economic magnitudes of internal financial aspirations (financial goals)
increase substantially versus those for high financial knowledge in Figure 1.2. For
instance, cumulatively the probabilities to achieve SWB outcomes 5 to 7 in Figure
1.2 in Panel (a) sum to -11 percentage points, while those in Figure 1.3 sum to
approximately -20 percentage points. Second, while the error bars indicate that
the AMEs for financial goals are precisely estimated, implying strong statistical
significance, those for financial commitments are not: most error bars include the
horizontal axis at zero. Third, all three panels provide a consistent picture of
the effects of financial aspirations regarding financial goals: the inability to meet
these aspirations when in financial distress is associated with strong deterioration
in subjective well-being.
Overall, the results provide strong evidence that internal financial aspirations
provide the mechanism through which financial knowledge influences subjective
well-being, while the channel of external financial aspirations appears to be insig-
nificant.
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1.5 Instrumental variable approach
We begin addressing causal identification challenges, such those induced by omit-
ted variable bias, in an instrumental variable approach. Specifically, individuals
with more materialistic attitudes might seek to acquire more financial knowledge
in order to achieve their desires to consume more. Further, materialism is asso-
ciated with lower negative subjective well-being levels (Grace et al., 2019) and
can thus be an important potential omitted variable, introducing bias in the OLS
estimate of the interaction between financial distress and high financial knowledge
on subjective well-being.
We use the method by Lewbel (2012) to achieve identification of these interac-
tion terms. Specifically, Lewbel (2012) shows that it is possible to identify the
effect of potentially endogenous regressors, in the absence of strong candidates for
instrumental variables, if exogenous variables (Z) and heteroskedastic errors are
present. We describe the mechanics of the method below. In the context of our
application, the full set of control variables serves as our exogenous variables Z
for construction of heteroskedasticity-based instruments: married or cohabitating,
good health, University education, no dependent children, age, female and house-
hold income. We further include an additional set of control variables that capture
childhood interactions regarding financial education between the respondents and
their parents for the purpose of this instrumental variable analysis.
This identification method can be combined with the traditional instrumental vari-
able approach. In two specifications, we complement the generated heteroskedasticy-
based instruments, whose construction is described in the below, with an instru-
mental variable that captures whether the respondents’ parents were University
educated.
In order to qualify as a valid instrument, this external instrumental variable ought
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to satisfy the requirements to (i) be strongly related to the potentially endogen-
ous variable, financial knowledge, and (ii) to influence subjective well-being only
through its effect on financial knowledge. University educated parents are likely
to have higher degrees of financial knowledge (Lusardi et al., 2017) and to con-
sequently to pass this knowledge on to their children, in turn raising their children’s
financial knowledge levels, together with their motivations to remain financially lit-
erate as adults. Thus, we expect a strong relationship between the instrument and
the endogenous regressor, thereby satisfying condition (i), instrumental relevance.
Further, given the inclusion of the additional child-parent background variables,
parents’ University education is unlikely to exert a direct influence on the re-
spondents’ subjective well-being levels; thus meeting condition (ii), the exclusion
restriction. Overall, it appears likely that the criteria for valid instruments are
satisfied in our setting. Given that the inclusion of additional heteroskedasticity-
based instruments will provide more instruments than endogenous regressors, we
will, in addition to the instrumental relevance condition, be able to provide evid-
ence in favour of the exclusion restriction being satisfied by testing the validity of
the overidentifying restrictions.
We use the Stata implementation ivreg2h (Schaffer & Baum, 2012) of the Lew-
bel (2012) two-stage estimator. To construct the heteroskedasticity-based instru-
ments, each endogenous variable is regressed on all of the control variables in the
subjective well-being equation (denoted below by vector X) along with the vector
Z, in following first-stage regression:
1(FinDistressi = 1 and HighFinKnowi = 0) = α1 +X ′iβ1 + Z ′iγ1 + εi,1 (1.11)
1(FinDistressi = 1 and HighFinKnowi = 1) = α2 +X ′iβ2 + Z ′iγ2 + εi,2 (1.12)
1(FinDistressi = 1 and HighFinKnowi = 1) = α3 +X ′iβ3 + Z ′iγ3 + εi,3 (1.13)
where 1(·) take the value one if the argument is true and zero otherwise. The re-
29
1.5. Instrumental variable approach
siduals ε̂i,1, ε̂i,2 and ε̂i,3 are then retrieved in order to create the heteroskedasticity-
based instruments as follows:
(Zi − Z̄)ε̂i,s for s = 1, 2, 3 (1.14)
where Z̄ is the vector of sample means of Zi, ∀i. As Lewbel (2012) shows, iden-
tification requires that the error terms in the first-stage regressions in Equations
(1.11) to (1.13) are heteroskedastic; we therefore follow the recommendations in
Baum and Lewbel (2019) and use the Breusch-Pagan test of heteroskedasticity. In
all cases, the results show that the null of homoskedastic errors is clearly rejected
in each first-stage regression with a p-value effectively equal to zero. We then use
the set of instruments obtained through Equation (1.14) for each first-stage re-
gression in (1.11) to (1.13) in a standard two-stage instrumental variable approach
to estimate the causal effects of the interaction between financial distress and high
financial knowledge on aggregate subjective well-being.
Table 1.6 reports the regression results. Columns (1) to (4) all show the results
from the second-stage equation in which aggregate subjective well-being is the
dependent variable. Column (1) shows the results in which the control variables
denoted by (i) are used in the construction of heteroskedasticity-based instru-
ments, and where the external instrument (Unversity-educated parents) is ex-
cluded from the first-stage regression. In Column (2), this external instrument
is included, keeping the remainder of the Column (1) specification unaltered.
Columns (3) and (4) use all controls, denoted (i) and (ii), in the construction
of the heteroskedasticity-based instruments. Columns (3) and (4) differ in the in-
clusion of the external instrument: Column (3) excludes this instrument; Column
(4) does not.
Importantly, two tests suggest that the instrumental variables in the approaches
in Columns (1) to (4) identify the causal effects of the interactions between fin-
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ancial distress and high financial knowledge on aggregate subjective well-being.
First, the first-stage F statistics in all columns exceed the 10% critical value by
Stock and Yogo (2005), suggesting that weak identification is of little concern
and, specifically, that the instrumental relevance condition is met. In particular,
the F statistics in Columns (1) and (2) are greater than the corresponding 5%
critical value, suggesting that the heteroskedasticity-based instruments generated
from the controls (i) are more strongly related to the endogenous regressors than
those in (ii). Further, in all columns, the p-values for the Hansen (1982) J statistic
indicate failure to reject the null that the overidentifying restrictions are violated,
suggesting no evidence that the exclusion restriction is not met.
Table 1.6 thus shows the effect of the interaction between financial distress and
high financial knowledge on aggregate subjective well-being. The main focus in
this table is on the moderating effect of high financial knowledge in the relationship
between financial distress and subjective well-being. The corresponding estimates
can be interpreted as heterogeneous treatment effects of financial distress with re-
spect to financial knowledge levels. It emerges that the interactions involving cases
of financially distressed are all highly significant (p < 0.01). The corresponding
effect sizes for low financial knowledge respondents are stable across all columns
with magnitudes of approximately −0.7; whereas the magnitudes for high finan-
cial knowledge respondents vary between −1.438 (Column (1)) to −1.346 (Column
(4)). This shows that the negative effect of financial distress almost doubles as
financial knowledge increases from low to high.
The findings of these sections provide causal evidence that financial knowledge
acts as a mediating variable for the effect of financial distress on subjective well-
being; thus, we contribute evidence for financial knowledge as a channel in the
relationship between financial resources and subjective well-being (Deaton, 2008;
Kahneman & Deaton, 2010).
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1.6 Propensity score matching
In order to reduce potential biases in estimating the association between financial
knowledge and subjective well-being stemming from the endogenous acquisition
of financial knowledge, we use a standard propensity score matching approach
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). For instance, Lusardi et al.
(2017) show that individuals face differing incentives to acquire financial knowledge
when smoothing consumption over their life cycles. For some individuals, this
can lead to a need to maximise returns on investments, thereby forming a strong
motive to increase financial knowledge. In other words, these individuals can select
into the high financial group of respondents given their observable characteristics,
potentially introducing self-selection bias into the estimation of the treatment
effect of financial knowledge on subjective well-being.
Specifically, given this heterogeneity in incentives to acquire financial knowledge,
we face the concern that for some individuals, in light of their own characteristics
and circumstances, the possibility exists that it is never optimal to acquire high
financial knowledge. This zero probability of being equipped with financial know-
ledge, formally expressed as the violation of the Common Support assumption,
disqualifies these respondents as valid members of the control group in the estim-
ation of the treatment effect of financial knowledge. Intuitively, identifying the
treatment effect requires that the subjective well-being levels of the control group
are a good substitute for the counterfactual outcomes of the highly knowledgeable
individuals had they instead been endowed with low financial knowledge. Indi-
viduals that are too different and will never acquire high financial knowledge are
clearly unsuitable for approximation of these counterfactual outcomes and ought
to be discarded from analysis. Propensity score matching makes this notion oper-
ational, and we describe the estimation details in the next section.
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In the estimation of the propensity scores, we restrict our sample to those re-
spondents in financial distress. Following from the above, our approach involves
discarding from the analysis those individuals in financial distress that have low
estimated likelihoods of acquiring financial knowledge levels given their observed
characteristics. Our subsample of interest in this exercise is the group of finan-
cially distressed respondents with high financial knowledge and the 1-to-1 nearest
neighbour matched low financial knowledge respondents. Aside from the associ-
ated econometric considerations, it is of direct economic interest to inspect the
relationship between financial knowledge and subjective well-being directly in the
subset of respondents facing financial distress. Confirming that the observed rela-
tionships hold in this group of respondents is crucially important, as respondents
outside of financial distress will be significantly less likely to select into financial
education programmes designed for poverty alleviation. In this way, we directly
establish the relevance of our findings for financial educators who likely will be
in close contact with such individuals and may consider the implications of the
associations we uncover for curriculum design.
1.6.1 Obtaining the matched sample
In order to obtain a matched sample of respondents, we employ the high financial
knowledge indicator variable introduced in the preceding sections, HighFinKnowi,
that takes the value one if the respondents’ financial knowledge levels are greater
than the sample average, and zero otherwise. We subset the full data for only those
respondents experiencing financial distress and then estimate a probit model with
HighFinKnowi as the dependent variable. From the estimated model, we obtain
the predicted propensity scores for each respondent, i, given their observed charac-
teristics, Xi. The included observable characteristics capture whether respondents
are married or cohabiting, have good health, a University education, no children
33
1.6.1. Obtaining the matched sample
to financially support, as well as the respondents’ ages, genders and household
incomes.




i > 0), (1.15)
ps∗i = X
′
iθ + εi, ∀i ∈ {i | FinDistressi = 1}, (1.16)
where ps∗i denotes the latent propensity score for individual i, while 1(·) is the
indicator function, taking the value one if the argument is true and zero otherwise,
and εi is a standard normal error term. The predicted latent propensities from this
probit regression are then used to construct a nearest-neighbour matched sample
of respondents; where those with high financial knowledge (HighFinKnowi equal
to unity) are matched, without replacement, to those with the closest propensity
score chosen from the group of respondents with low financial knowledge levels
(HighFinKnowi equal to zero).
The assess whether our matching procedure results in balancing the observed
characteristics between high and low financial knowledge respondents and suc-
ceeds in constructing a sample in which high financial knowledge occurs as-if
randomly between respondents, we follow the approach by Rodnyansky and Dar-
mouni (2017) and conduct the following test: we compare the estimates from
the probit model in Equation (1.16) that generates the propensity scores with
the results of the equivalently specified probit model estimated using the sample
of matched respondents only. After matching, none of the employed covariates
should be predictive of high financial knowledge, and the predicted baseline prob-
abilities of the re-estimated probit model should indicate high financial knowledge
occurring with 50% probability.
34
1.6.1. Obtaining the matched sample
Table 1.7 reports the results. Compared to the propensity score model in Columns
(1), the magnitudes of the probit regression coefficients decline when compared to
the probit model using the matched sample in Column (2). Importantly, none of
the sources of heterogeneity continue to play any role in explaining high financial
knowledge levels, whereas the variables University education, age, female and
household income were statistically significant in the pre-match model of Column
(1). Furthermore, in Column (2), the χ2 test for overall model fit shows that one
cannot reject the null hypothesis that all coefficient estimates are zero: the p-
value equals 0.625. Further, the baseline predicted probability using the matched
sample equals 50%. Overall, we conclude from this test results that the matching
process removes meaningful differences along observable dimensions between the
two groups of respondents with high and low financial knowledge.
Moreover, Table 1.8 reports the covariate differences in means across low and
high financial knowledge levels for the full and matched samples. The columns
are split by financial knowledge (FK) levels, reporting the respective respondent
means together with the differences in means (∆) between low and high financial
knowledge levels, in addition to t-tests for their statistical significance. Overall,
the t-tests indicate that in the full sample the respondent characteristics across
low and high financial knowledge levels are strongly significant, except for the vari-
able no dependent children. This is in contrast to the matched sample obtained
through propensity score matching: the differences between financial knowledge
groups are insignificant at the 10% level and economically negligible. These res-
ults strengthen the case that the subjective well-being outcomes of the low finan-
cial knowledge group constitute reasonable approximations for the high financial
knowledge respondents’ counterfactual outcomes.
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1.6.2 Results using the matched sample
We now turn to estimating the relationships between financial knowledge, financial
aspirations and subjective well-being using information on respondents in financial
distress that were matched in the process of balancing the respondents’ covariates
across low and high financial knowledge groups. In this way, the influence of the
endogenous acquisition of financial knowledge is attenuated.
Employing this propensity-score-matched subset of respondents, we begin by re-
gressing our aggregate subjective well-being variable (SubjWellBeingi) on the
high financial knowledge indicator variable, HighFinKnowi:
SubjWellBeingi = α + γ(HighFinKnowi) +X
′
iθ + εi,
∀i ∈ {i | FinDistressi = 1 and Matchedi = 1}, (1.17)
where Xi captures the respondents’ characteristics used in the matching procedure
and εi is a normal error term. The parameter γ is the key association between
financial knowledge and aggregate subjective well-being.
In order to account for the limited-dependent nature of the additional subjective
well-being variables, in line with the discussions in the preceding sections, we again






d + γd(HighFinKnowi) +X
′
iθ
d + εdi ,
∀i ∈ {i | FinDistressi = 1 and Matchedi = 1}, (1.19)
where the superscript d indicates the different subjective well-being variables (“I
am satisfied with my life”, “I am optimistic about my future” or “If I work hard
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today, I will be more successful in future”, respectively). As before, the function
g(·) is the ordered probit link introduced in Equation (1.4). The regression error
term, εi follows a standard normal distribution in accordance with the ordered
probit normalisation assumption.
Table 1.9 reports the estimation results. Column (1) shows the results for aggreg-
ate subjective well-being, while Columns (2) to (4) show those for the respective
individual dimensions of subjective well-being. Column (1) shows that the signific-
ance of high financial knowledge for aggregate subjective well-being has dropped
to marginal significance at the 10% level. From Columns (2) to (4) it appears
that this drop in significance can be attributed to the insignificance of high fin-
ancial knowledge for the variables “Optimistic about my future” and “Work hard
today, successful in future”; however, high financial knowledge remains strongly
significant for the variable “Satisfied with my life”.
While these results corroborate the conclusion drawn from our earlier sections –
that life satisfaction deteriorates for high financial knowledge individuals in adverse
financial circumstances – these results are strongly encouraging for interventions
seeking to improve the financial prospects of the financially distressed. Though
life satisfaction deteriorates, optimism about the future and the belief that hard
work pays off are not affected. Consequently, this suggests the possibility that the
motivations of these respondents to better their circumstances are unaffected, po-
tentially providing the opportunity for public policy interventions to be positively
received by these individuals.
We further investigate the importance of financial aspirations for the subsample
of the financially distressed as a mediating variable between high financial know-
ledge and subjective well-being. In order to do so, we slightly adapt the regres-
sion frameworks described in Section 1.4.4. In the case of the linear specification
for the aggregate subjective well-being variable, this takes the form of an inter-
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action between financial aspirations (Aspirationi) and high financial knowledge
(HighFinKnowi) on the subset of financially distressed respondents:
SubjWellBeingi = α + γ1(Aspirationi) + γ2(HighFinKnowi)
+ γ3(HighFinKnowi × Aspirationi)
+X ′iθ + εi,
∀i ∈ {i | FinDistressi = 1 and Matchedi = 1}, (1.20)
Whereas the ordered probit specification for the individual dimensions of subject-





d + γd1(Aspirationi) + γ
d
2(HighFinKnowi)
+ γd3(HighFinKnowi × Aspirationi)
+X ′iθ
d + εdi ,
∀i ∈ {i | FinDistressi = 1 and Matchedi = 1}, (1.22)
All other features of the regression framework remain the same.
Table 1.10 reports the estimation results. Panel A displays the results for the
aspirations relating to the individuals’ own financial goals; Panel B shows those
for financial commitments towards others. Column (1) displays the regression
results for the aggregate subjective well-being measures, and Columns (2) to (4)
show those for the individual subjective well-being dimensions.
Two findings stand out in Panel A. The interaction between high financial know-
ledge (for brevity, denoted in this table by FK) and the inability to meet financial
goals is highly significant (p < 0.01) across all columns. While the interaction for
low financial knowledge individuals that cannot meet their financial goals is also
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significant, the coefficient estimates in all cases approximately double in magnitude
for those with high financial knowledge. Second, for high financial individuals that
can meet their financial goals, the effect on subjective well-being is insignificant,
with the exception for the variable “Satisfied with my life”, though for this case
statistical significance is marginal at the 10% level. These findings together corrob-
orate that the inability to meet financial goals constitutes a significant mediator
between high financial knowledge and subjective well-being.
Panel B does not show clear evidence that the inability to meet financial com-
mitments towards others is a mediator between high financial knowledge and sub-
jective well-being. In Columns (1) and (2), both interaction terms involving high
financial knowledge are statistically significant, while only one is so in Column
(3), and none in Column (4). This indicates that it is indeed not the inability
to meet financial commitments towards others that moderates the relationship
between financial knowledge and subjective well-being but that to meet one’s own
financial goals.
1.7 Limitations and future research
In the light of their possible relevance for financial educators, our findings identify
a need for further research. It is important to understand whether lower subject-
ive well-being levels for high financial knowledge individuals in financial distress
strengthen or depress their motivations to return to more positive financial out-
comes. For example, in the case of the link between financial literacy and fraud
detection, Engels et al. (2020) show that lower levels of subjective well-being di-
minish the abilities of the highly financially literate to detect fraud. The case of
depleting motivations could suggest an additional channel through which the link
between financial education and financial outcomes could be put at risk and would
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complement the findings of Carpena, Cole, Shapiro and Zia (2019) who explore
non-financial personal constraints that can impede the transmission of financial
education to financial outcomes.
In addition, a limitation of this study is the reliance on the cross-sectional nature
of our sample. While we attenuate endogeneity concerns through an instrumental
variable and propensity score matching approach, we cannot provide conclusive
evidence that an intervention that raises financial literacy levels will unambigu-
ously lead to a decrease in subjective well-being levels for financially distressed
individuals. Future work could exploit time-ordered data to examine changes in
financial distress status on subjective well-being levels across financial knowledge
groups and over time or test for the presence of causal effects in a randomised
control trial approach.
1.8 Conclusion
This thesis chapter provides evidence for how financial literacy influences subject-
ive well-being for respondents in financial distress using a representative survey
from the year 2016 of 6394 US respondents. The empirical analysis reveals two im-
portant findings. First, individuals in financial distress suffer higher deterioration
in their life satisfaction when their financial knowledge is high versus correspond-
ing decreases for low financial knowledge respondents. Second, a significant driver
of deteriorating life satisfaction for these respondents is the inability to meet the
financial goals they set for themselves. Interestingly, not being able to meet fin-
ancial commitments towards others does not affect the subjective well-being of
high and low financial knowledge respondents differently. In order to assign a
causal interpretation to these findings, we implement two approaches to mitigate
endogeneity concerns. First, we instrument the interactions of financial distress
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and high financial knowledge with heteroskedasticity-based instruments using the
method by Lewbel (2012). Second, we test the observed relationships for the sub-
sample of financially distressed respondents, matching high financial knowledge
respondents 1-to-1 to low knowledge respondents in a propensity score matching
approach. Both approaches support that financial literacy is inversely related to
subjective well-being for respondents in financial distress.
These results have relevance for policy in light of two parallel developments in pub-
lic policy. First, as higher subjective well-being has been found to positively influ-
ence a variety of desirable outcomes, such as health, life expectancy, productivity
and the quality of relationships, systematic efforts to measure subjective well-being
at the national and local level are underway; in many instances informing public
policy decisions (Diener, Oishi & Tay, 2018). Second, financial distress, as meas-
ured by problems fulfilling basic consumption needs relating to housing, utilities,
health care or food, is prevalent in the US population. In 2017, approximately
40% of US adults across the income distribution experienced at least one of these
issues, and, among those affected, 60.2% experienced problems in two or more of
these domains (Karpman et al., 2018). As a consequence, poverty alleviation pro-
grammes to reduce financial distress, such as financial education programmes, have
attracted considerable interest (Brown & Robinson, 2016; McKernan, Ratcliffe &
Iceland, 2018). These two policy agendas risks being at odds with one another if
the interplay between financial distress, financial knowledge and subjective well-
being is not reflected in their designs. Our findings indicate that, in order to avoid
such a clash, public policy can combine the provision in financial education pro-
grammes with financial support on preferential terms that empowers financially
distressed individuals to attain their immediate financial goals.
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Figure 1.1
Financial distress, subjective well-being and financial knowledge
This figure shows the proportions of individuals with subjective well-being greater
than the sample average. Panel (a) shows the values for aggregate subjective
well-being; Panel (b) for the dimension “Satisfied with my life”; Panel (c) for
“Optimistic about my future”; and Panel (d) for "Work hard today, successful in
the future”. The horizontal axis separates individuals by their levels of financial
knowledge. Financial knowledge is defined as low (high) when it is below (above)
the sample average. The white and grey bars indicate proportions for individuals
without and with recent experiences of financial distress, respectively. The exact
variable definitions can be found in the Appendix.
(c) Optimistic about my future (c) Work hard today,successful in future
(a) Aggregate subjective well-being (b) Satisfied with my life
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42
Figure 1.2
High financial knowledge average marginal effects
This figure shows financial knowledge average marginal effects (AMEs) (vertical axis) for
each ordered probit regression outcome (horizontal axis) with respect to the subjective well-
being variables indicated in Panels (a) to (c). The error bars display the corresponding 95%
confidence intervals. Black triangles show the high financial knowledge AMEs for respondents
inside of financial distress; white triangles for those outside of financial distress. Panel (a)
shows the AMEs for “Satisfied with my life”; Panel (b) for “Optimistic about my future”;
and Panel (c) for "Work hard today, successful in the future”. The exact variable definitions
can be found in the Appendix.
(c) Word hard today, successful in future
(a) Satisfied with my life (b) Optimistic about my future
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Figure 1.3
Financial aspirations average marginal effects
This figure shows financial aspirations average marginal effects (AMEs) (vertical axis) for each ordered probit regression outcome
(horizontal axis) with respect to the subjective well-being variables indicated in Panels (a) to (c). The AMEs are calculated
for the subsample of high financial knowledge respondents in financial distress. The error bars display the corresponding 95%
confidence intervals. White bars show AMEs for respondents that report an inability to meet their own financial goals; grey
bars for those that report an inability to meet financial commitments to others. Panel (a) shows the AMEs for “Satisfied with
my life”; Panel (b) for “Optimistic about my future”; and Panel (c) for “Work hard today, successful in the future”. The exact
variable definitions can be found in the Appendix.
(a) Satisfied with my life (b) Optimistic about my future (c) Word hard today, successful in future
























This table reports the summary statistics for our baseline data sample. The data
is sourced from the 2016 National Financial well-being survey. The Appendix
provides exact definitions of all variables.
Mean Min. Max. SD Obs.
Aggregate subjective wellbeing 13.30 0.00 18.00 3.65 6314
Satisfied with my life 4.39 0.00 6.00 1.43 6363
Optimistic about my future 4.42 0.00 6.00 1.43 6337
Work hard today, successful in future 4.50 0.00 6.00 1.48 6329
Financial knowledge -0.06 -2.05 1.27 0.81 6394
Financial distress 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.45 6394
Married or cohabiting 0.66 0.00 1.00 0.48 6394
Good health 0.85 0.00 1.00 0.36 6394
University education 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.48 6394
No dependent children 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.47 6394
Age 51.26 21.00 75.00 17.22 6394
Female 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.50 6394
Household income (1000s) 75.31 10.00 150.00 46.18 6394
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Table 1.2
Financial knowledge and subjective well-being by financial distress
This table reports an analysis of the differences in subjective well-being means by financial knowledge levels for respondents with
recent experiences of financial distress. The mean values capture the proportions of respondents with subjective well-being greater
than the sample average along the respective dimensions. The columns report the counts and means for financial knowledge levels,
together with the difference in proportions (∆) and the results of t-tests for differences in means. The exact variable definitions
can be found in the Appendix. The stars ***, ** and * denote levels of significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
Financial knowledge
Low High
Count Mean Count Mean ∆ t
Aggregate subjective well-being > average 1304 0.30 504 0.24 -0.06 -2.58***
Satisfied with my life > average 1310 0.17 505 0.09 -0.08 -5.16***
Optimistic about my future > average 1311 0.24 506 0.15 -0.10 -4.89***
Work hard today, successful in future > average 1311 0.32 505 0.22 -0.09 -4.17***
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Table 1.3
Financial distress and subjective well-being
This table reports the results of OLS and ordered probit regressions of Equations (1.1) and (1.2) . The dependent variables in
Columns (1) to (4) are the indicated dimensions of subjective well-being. The independent variable of interest is the financial
distress indicator. The exact variable definitions can be found in the Appendix. The point estimates are OLS coefficients in
Column (1) and ordered probit coefficients in Columns (2) to (4). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial distress -1.735*** -0.560*** -0.403*** -0.297***
(0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Married or cohabiting 0.597*** 0.290*** 0.148*** 0.068**
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Good health 2.336*** 0.607*** 0.628*** 0.428***
(0.14) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
University education -0.052 -0.047 0.028 -0.066**
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
No dependent children 0.242** -0.001 0.080*** 0.082***
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age -0.012*** 0.007*** -0.005*** -0.011***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.087 0.095*** 0.057** -0.049*
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Household income 0.003** 0.001 0.000 0.001**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 11.738***
(0.23)








Observations 6314 6363 6337 6329
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Table 1.4
Financial distress, financial knowledge and subjective well-being
This table reports the results of OLS and ordered probit regressions. The dependent variables in Columns (1) to (4) are the
indicated dimensions of subjective well-being. The independent variables of interest are interactions between the financial
distress and high financial knowledge indicators. Financial knowledge greater than the sample average is defined as high. The
exact variable definitions can be found in the Appendix. The point estimates are OLS coefficients in Column (1) and ordered
probit coefficients in Columns (2) to (4). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The stars ***, ** and * denote









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial distress=0 × High financial knowledge=1 -0.178* -0.049 -0.061* -0.081**
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Financial distress=1 × High financial knowledge=0 (γ2) -1.548*** -0.504*** -0.364*** -0.274***
(0.14) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Financial distress=1 × High financial knowledge=1 (γ3) -2.365*** -0.744*** -0.566*** -0.454***
(0.19) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Married or cohabiting 0.601*** 0.291*** 0.149*** 0.068**
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Good health 2.350*** 0.612*** 0.633*** 0.433***
(0.14) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
University education 0.009 -0.029 0.046 -0.045
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
No dependent children 0.247*** 0.000 0.081*** 0.083***
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age -0.010*** 0.008*** -0.004*** -0.011***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.043 0.082*** 0.043 -0.064**
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Household income 0.003*** 0.001** 0.000 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 11.652***
(0.23)
Prob > F (H0 : γ2 = γ3) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002








Observations 6314 6363 6337 6329
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Table 1.5
Mechanism: financial goals and commitments
This table reports the results of OLS and ordered probit regressions. The dependent variables in Columns (1) to (4) are the
indicated dimensions of subjective well-being. The independent variables of interest are triple interactions between the financial
distress (FD) and high financial knowledge (FK) indicators, as well as indicators capturing whether individuals do not follow
through with their own financial goals (Panel A) or their financial commitments towards others (Panel B), respectively. The
exact variable definitions can be found in the Appendix. The point estimates are OLS coefficients in Column (1) and ordered
probit coefficients in Columns (2) to (4). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The stars ***, ** and * denote









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Financial goals
FD=0 × FK=0 × Cannot meet financial goals=1 -1.875*** -0.724*** -0.461*** -0.342***
(0.30) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
FD=0 × FK=1 × Cannot meet financial goals=0 -0.208** -0.070** -0.066* -0.091**
(0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
FD=0 × FK=1 × Cannot meet financial goals=1 -2.184*** -0.691*** -0.621*** -0.379***
(0.39) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
FD=1 × FK=0 × Cannot meet financial goals=0 -1.398*** -0.477*** -0.340*** -0.253***
(0.15) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
FD=1 × FK=0 × Cannot meet financial goals=1 -3.133*** -1.008*** -0.717*** -0.538***
(0.28) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
FD=1 × FK=1 × Cannot meet financial goals=0 (λ6) -1.965*** -0.676*** -0.484*** -0.380***
(0.20) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
FD=1 × FK=1 × Cannot meet financial goals=1 (λ7) -4.710*** -1.349*** -1.100*** -0.892***
(0.43) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
Married or cohabiting 0.574*** 0.287*** 0.143*** 0.064**
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Good health 2.211*** 0.581*** 0.607*** 0.412***
(0.14) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
University education -0.056 -0.049 0.031 -0.056*
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
No dependent children 0.265*** 0.008 0.087*** 0.086***











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Financial goals
Age -0.011*** 0.008*** -0.005*** -0.011***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.027 0.079*** 0.040 -0.068**
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Household income 0.003*** 0.001** 0.000 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 12.012***








Baseline predicted subjective wellbeing 13.298
Prob > F (H0 : γ6 = γ7) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Financial commitments
FD=0 × FK=0 × Cannot meet financial commitments=1 -0.607 -0.283* -0.096 -0.096
(0.55) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
FD=0 × FK=1 × Cannot meet financial commitments=0 -0.164 -0.048 -0.054 -0.080**
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
FD=0 × FK=1 × Cannot meet financial commitments=1 -3.075*** -0.883*** -0.884*** -0.453*
(0.85) (0.26) (0.23) (0.24)
FD=1 × FK=0 × Cannot meet financial commitments=0 -1.456*** -0.483*** -0.341*** -0.271***
(0.14) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
FD=1 × FK=0 × Cannot meet financial commitments=1 -2.886*** -0.892*** -0.692*** -0.356***
(0.41) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
FD=1 × FK=1 × Cannot meet financial commitments=0 (λ6) -2.324*** -0.744*** -0.553*** -0.450***
(0.19) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
FD=1 × FK=1 × Cannot meet financial commitments=1 (λ7) -3.937*** -1.076*** -1.001*** -0.639**
(1.07) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26)
Married or cohabiting 0.586*** 0.288*** 0.145*** 0.067**
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Good health 2.295*** 0.598*** 0.622*** 0.429***











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B: Financial commitments
University education -0.011 -0.035 0.040 -0.048
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
No dependent children 0.261*** 0.005 0.085*** 0.084***
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age -0.010*** 0.008*** -0.005*** -0.011***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.014 0.073*** 0.036 -0.068**
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Household income 0.003*** 0.001* 0.000 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 11.776***
(0.23)








Baseline predicted subjective wellbeing 13.298




This table reports the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) instrumental variable regres-
sion results for the second stage using Lewbel’s (2012) method, where all included interactions
between financial distress and financial knowledge are instrumented with various combinations
of heteroskedasticity-based instruments and an external instrument capturing whether the re-
spondents’ parent completed university education. In addition to the baseline set of controls
(i), variables are included that capture the respondents’ recollections on interactions with their
parents regarding financial education (ii). The reported coefficients are GMM point estimates.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The exact variable definitions are reported
in the Appendix. The stars ***, ** and * denote levels of significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent,
respectively.
Aggregate subjective well-being
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial distress=0 × High financial knowledge=1 -0.246* -0.231* -0.278** -0.263**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Financial distress=1 × High financial knowledge=0 -0.721*** -0.718*** -0.707*** -0.704***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Financial distress=1 × High financial knowledge=1 -1.438*** -1.423*** -1.363*** -1.346***
(0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)
(i) Baseline controls:
Married or cohabiting 0.378*** 0.378*** 0.378*** 0.378***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Good health 0.761*** 0.762*** 0.768*** 0.770***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
University education -0.011 -0.014 -0.008 -0.011
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
No dependent children 0.045 0.046 0.038 0.039
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.065* 0.067* 0.053 0.055
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Household income 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(ii) Childhood parent financial education controls:
Discussed family financial matters with me 0.085** 0.084** 0.089** 0.088**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Spoke to me about the importance of saving 0.060 0.060 0.055 0.055
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Discussed how to establish a good credit rating 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.114*** 0.115***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Taught me how to be a smart shopper 0.087** 0.087** 0.103** 0.102**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Taught me that my actions determine my success in life 0.200*** 0.198*** 0.188*** 0.186***




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Provided me with a regular allowance 0.010 0.011 0.007 0.008
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Provided me with a savings account -0.028 -0.027 -0.029 -0.028
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 2.871*** 2.869*** 2.850*** 2.848***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Observations 6363 6363 6363 6363
External instrument (University-educated parents) No Yes No Yes
Controls for generated instruments (i) (i) (i), (ii) (i), (ii)
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Cragg-Donald F statistic 30.96 29.95 17.22 16.99
Stock-Yogo maximal IV size critical value:
5% 19.67 19.77 20.59 20.61
10% 10.63 10.65 10.81 10.81
Hansen J statistic 13.64 14.46 36.53 37.76
Prob > J 0.75 0.76 0.58 0.57




This table reports the coefficient estimates of probit regressions. The results are
based on the subsample of respondents with recent experiences of financial distress.
The dependent variables are indicators taking the value one when the respondents’
financial knowledge is greater than the full sample average (including respondents
outside of financial distress), and zero otherwise. Column (1) reports the results
for all repsondents in financial distress, which is the model to generate the in-
dividual propensity scores, while Column (2) reports the results for the sample
obtained after matching on the propensity scores. The variables used in propensity
score matching are the those shown in this table. The Appendix provides exact
definitions of all variables. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The stars







Married or cohabiting 0.053 -0.033
(0.07) (0.09)
Good health 0.032 -0.035
(0.08) (0.10)
University education 0.465*** 0.126
(0.08) (0.09)










Baseline predicted probability .277 .500
χ2 221.270 5.284





This table reports an analysis of the differences in means for the baseline controls
by financial knowledge levels (FK) before and after propensity score matching.
Financial knowledge is defined as low (high) when it is below (above) the average
of the full sample. The columns report the mean for the respective variable,
together with the difference in means between financial knowledge levels (∆) and
the results of t-tests for differences in means. The exact variable definitions can
be found in the Appendix. The stars ***, ** and * denote levels of significance at
1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
Full sample Matched sample
FK FK
Low High ∆ t Low High ∆ t
Married or cohabitating 0.51 0.63 -0.12 -4.47*** 0.62 0.63 -0.01 -0.26
Good health 0.71 0.76 -0.05 -2.05** 0.76 0.76 0.01 0.22
University education 0.16 0.38 -0.23 -10.73*** 0.34 0.38 -0.04 -1.44
No dependent children 0.39 0.41 -0.02 -0.77 0.39 0.41 -0.02 -0.70
Age 43.12 49.13 -6.00 -7.21*** 47.72 49.13 -1.40 -1.40
Female 0.56 0.42 0.14 5.24*** 0.41 0.42 -0.01 -0.38
Household income 43.65 66.48 -22.82 -11.44*** 65.11 66.48 -1.37 -0.52
Observations 1325 508 508 508
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Table 1.9
Baseline results on PSM sample
This table reports the results of OLS and probit regressions. The sample includes all
respondents with high financial knowledge together with the matched low financial
knowledge group of respondents obtained through propensity score matching. The
dependent variables in Columns (1) to (4) are the indicated dimensions of subjective
well-being. The independent variables of interest is high financial knowledge. The
point estimates are OLS coefficients in Column (1) and ordered probit coefficients
in Columns (2) to (4). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The














(1) (2) (3) (4)
High financial knowledge -0.484* -0.172*** -0.074 -0.105
(0.25) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Married or cohabiting 0.700** 0.328*** 0.180** -0.029
(0.28) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Good health 2.372*** 0.550*** 0.577*** 0.422***
(0.30) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
University education -0.031 -0.026 0.017 -0.073
(0.27) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
No dependent children 0.375 -0.036 0.122* 0.168**
(0.27) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Age -0.014* 0.007*** -0.006** -0.010***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female -0.217 -0.019 -0.022 -0.057
(0.25) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Household income 0.004 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 9.921***
(0.55)








Observations 1005 1007 1009 1009
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Table 1.10
Mechanism on PSM sample
This table reports the results of OLS and ordered probit regressions. The sample includes all respondents with high financial
knowledge together with the matched low financial knowledge group of respondents obtained through propensity score matching.
The dependent variables in Columns (1) to (4) are the indicated dimensions of subjective well-being. The independent variables
of interest are triple interactions between the financial distress (FD) and high financial knowledge (FK) indicators, as well as
indicators capturing whether individuals do not follow through with their own financial goals (Panel A) or their financial
commitments towards others (Panel B), respectively. The exact variable definitions can be found in the Appendix. The point
estimates are OLS coefficients in Column (1) and ordered probit coefficients in Columns (2) to (4). Robust standard errors are









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Financial goals
FK=0 × Cannot meet financial goals=1 -1.640*** -0.487*** -0.325*** -0.301**
(0.44) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
FK=1 × Cannot meet financial goals=0 -0.233 -0.128* -0.010 -0.057
(0.27) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
FK=1 × Cannot meet financial goals=1 -3.032*** -0.817*** -0.634*** -0.577***
(0.43) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Married or cohabiting 0.674** 0.331*** 0.176** -0.036
(0.27) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Good health 2.124*** 0.500*** 0.536*** 0.382***
(0.30) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
University education -0.217 -0.075 -0.022 -0.108
(0.27) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
No dependent children 0.323 -0.051 0.113 0.161**
(0.26) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Age -0.015* 0.007*** -0.006*** -0.010***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female -0.287 -0.039 -0.040 -0.072
(0.25) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Household income 0.004 0.001* -0.000 0.001*












(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Financial goals








Baseline predicted subjective wellbeing 11.537
Panel B: Financial commitments
FK=0 × Cannot meet financial commitments=1 -0.827 -0.204 -0.282* 0.014
(0.64) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
FK=1 × Cannot meet financial commitments=0 -0.474* -0.171** -0.075 -0.095
(0.26) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
FK=1 × Cannot meet financial commitments=1 -2.169** -0.550** -0.552** -0.290
(0.85) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Married or cohabiting 0.693** 0.327*** 0.178** -0.029
(0.27) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Good health 2.324*** 0.540*** 0.564*** 0.422***
(0.30) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
University education -0.070 -0.035 0.006 -0.077
(0.27) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
No dependent children 0.368 -0.038 0.121* 0.168**
(0.27) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Age -0.015* 0.006*** -0.006*** -0.010***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female -0.256 -0.029 -0.034 -0.060
(0.25) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Household income 0.004 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 10.126***
(0.56)












Panel A: Baseline analysis
Aggregate subjective wellbeing This variable is the sum of the subjective well-being dimensions “Satisfied
with my life”, “Optimistic about my future” and “Work hard today,
successful in future”. The variable takes integer values in the range from
3 to 21. Higher values indicate greater subjective wellbeing.
Satisfied with my life This variable captures the respondens agreement or disagreement with
the statement “I am satisfied with my life”. Possible answers are on the
7-point Likert scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Answers
are mapped to integer values ranging from 1 to 7, where greater values
indicate stronger agreement.
Optimistic about my future This variable captures the respondens agreement or disagreement with
the statement “I am optimistic about my future”. Possible answers are on
the 7-point Likert scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Answers
are mapped to integer values ranging from 1 to 7, where greater values
indicate stronger agreement.
Work hard today, successful in future This variable captures the respondens agreement or disagreement with
the statement “If I work hard today, I will be more successful in the
future”. Possible answers are on the 7-point Likert scale from strongly
agree to strongly disagree. Answers are mapped to integer values ranging
from 1 to 7, where greater values indicate stronger agreement.
Financial distress This variable captures whether respondents experienced any financial
distress “often” or “sometimes” in the past 12 months. Six dimensions
of material hardship are captured. Specifically, respondents are asked
whether each of the following statements applied “often”, “sometimes”
or “never” to them in the past 12 months:
1. I worried whether our food would run out before I got money to
buy more.
2. The food that I bought just didnt last and I didnt have money to
get more.
3. I couldn’t afford a place to live.
4. I or someone in my household needed to see a doctor or go to the
hospital but did not go because we couldnt afford it.
5. I or someone in my household stopped taking a medication or
took less than directed due to the costs.
6. One or more of my utilities was shut off due to non-payment.
This financial distress variable takes the value one if respondents
answered “often” or “sometimes” to any of these six questions, and zero
otherwise.
Financial knowledge This variable captures the 10-item Knoll and Houts (2012) Financial
Knowledge Scale. The variables ranges from -2.053 to 1.267. Higher
values indicate greater financial knowledge.
Cannot meet financial goals This variable takes the value one if the respondent chooses the response
“very little” or “Not at all” regarding the satement “I follow-through on
financial goals I set for myself”, and zero otherwise.
Cannot meet financial commitments This variable takes the value one if the respondent chooses the response
“very little” or “Not at all” regarding the satement “I follow-through on
my financial commitments to others”, and zero otherwise.
Married or cohabiting This variable takes the value one if respondents are married live with




Good health This variable takes the value one if respondents indicate that their health
in general is good, very good or excellent, and zero otherwise.
University education This variable takes the value one if respondents obtained a bachelor’s
degree or a graduate/professional degree, and zero otherwise.
No dependent children This variable takes the value one if respondents indicate that they have
no children they financially support, and zero otherwise.
Age The survey captures age of respondents in seven non-overlapping age
brackets, between 18 and 74, and the eighth age bracket captures re-
spondents older than 75. The variable Age for a respondent is equal
to the midpoint age of the age bracket the respondents belong to. For
respondents in the (first) eighth age bracket, the variable takes values
equal to the (upper) lower limit of the age bracket.
Female This variable takes the value one if the respondent is female, and zero
otherwise.
Household income The survey captures the income level of respondents (in 1000s), clas-
sified into nine non-overlapping income brackets and the ninth income
bracket captures income of $150,000 or above. The variable Income for a
respondent is equal to the midpoint income of the income bracket the re-
spondents belong to. For respondents in the lowermost income bracket,
the variable takes values equal to the upper limit of the income bracket.
Similarly, for the uppermost income bracket, the variable takes values
equal to the lower limit of the income bracket.
Panel B: Instrumental variable analysis
Parent university education This variable takes the value one if respondents’ parent obtained a bach-
elor’s degree or a graduate/professional degree, and zero otherwise.
Discussed family financial matters with
me
This variable takes the value one if the respondents’ parent interacted
with the respondent during childhood in the indicated manner, and zero
otherwise.
Spoke to me about the importance of
saving
This variable takes the value one if the respondents’ parent interacted
with the respondent during childhood in the indicated manner, and zero
otherwise.
Discussed how to establish good credit
rating
This variable takes the value one if the respondents’ parent interacted
with the respondent during childhood in the indicated manner, and zero
otherwise.
Taught me how to be a smart shopper This variable takes the value one if the respondents’ parent interacted
with the respondent during childhood in the indicated manner, and zero
otherwise.
Taught me that my actions determine
my success in life
This variable takes the value one if the respondents’ parent interacted
with the respondent during childhood in the indicated manner, and zero
otherwise.
Provided me with a regular allowance This variable takes the value one if the respondents’ parent interacted
with the respondent during childhood in the indicated manner, and zero
otherwise.
Provided me with a savings account This variable takes the value one if the respondents’ parent interacted




Social Norm Enforcement and
Mental Health
Highlights
∗ High welfarism – favourable attitudes towards the welfare state and benefit recip-
ients – is associated with an increased prevalence of mental health problem of 13
percentage points, a 39% increase against predicted population-wide levels.
∗ To test the hypothesis that expressing high welfarism constitutes a deviation from
work norms, resulting in social sanctioning and associated decreases in mental health,
the changes in magnitude of the relationship under conservative governments is tested,
who are known to be tougher on welfare. This reveals an intensifying of the relationship
relative to labour governments.
∗ Under conservative governments, the relationship is stronger for employed individu-
als, which exhibit high conformity with work norms, relative to those not in employ-
ment, suggesting that in-group social norm deviations are sanctioned more severely.
∗ Additional analysis reveals that the observed relationships are stronger for females
than for males. Further, the combination of high welfarism and mental health prob-
lems is associated with more favourable attitudes towards voting, suggesting increased




Policy makers are concerned about the significant costs that mental health prob-
lems inflict, rising to 4% of GDP (600 billion e) across the European Union
(OECD/EU, 2018). Research finds that an array of factors, from individual
characteristics and circumstances to wider economic conditions, influences mental
health (Bridges & Disney, 2010; Currie et al., 2015; Gathergood, 2012; Grip et al.,
2011). In this thesis chapter, we add to this body of research by investigating the
effect of social norm enforcement (Bernhard et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2006) on
mental health. As Posner (1997) notes: “Norms are also enforced by expressions
of disapproval, by ridicule, and in extreme cases, by ostracism. The efficacy of
the milder ‘sanctions’ lies in their implicit threat of ostracism, that is, of refusal
of advantageous transactions.” (p. 366) In light of the potential psychological re-
percussions these enforcement means can have, we thus ask: can the enforcement
of social norms harm mental health?
Specifically, we use representative data on welfare attitudes in the UK to study
the link between social norms enforcement and mental health. We propose that
in societies that assign a normative value to work (Lindbeck, Nyberg & Weibull,
1999, 2003), expressing positive welfare attitudes can imply a deviation from social
norms, resulting in social sanctioning and corresponding deteriorations in mental
health. The UK provides an ideal setting to study this notion, as UK government
welfare programmes constitute a significant mechanism of poverty alleviation; but,
at the same time, the global stigmatization of welfare (see for example Field, 2002;
Niskanen, 1996) has been particularly manifest in the UK society:
‘Fairness’, declared George Osborne, the then chancellor, in 2012, ‘is
about being fair to the person who leaves home every morning to go out
to work and sees their neighbour still asleep, living a life on benefits.’
Newspapers printed story after story about welfare fraudsters pinching
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2.1. Introduction
from the public purse, from the woman with two Samoyed dogs who
collected thousands of pounds a month and claimed, ‘It’s not worth
my while working,’ to the man who collected disability benefit while
competing in bodybuilding contests. In 2014 one in ten Britons tuned
in to ‘Benefits Street’, a documentary which featured welfare recipients
drinking and fighting on rubbish-strewn streets. [...] Back then it felt
impossible to be too mean to benefit claimants. They were a political
piñata: whack them and votes fell out. (The Economist, 2019)
Thus, as public understanding, goes “benefit scroungers” claim welfare and live off
the work of others (Geiger, 2017).1 The variations in the UK political environment
induced by the changes from labour to conservative governments in our sample
period, and the concomitant changes in policy stances and public rhetoric on
welfare, provide a plausible source of variation in the cost of sanctioning positive
welfare attitudes and thus the consequent enforcements of the social norm that
engaging in paid work is a normative good.
In our analysis, we use data from the British Social Attitudes (BSA) surveys
from the years 2000, 2003, 2006, 2007 and 2013. These years capture repetitions
of questions pertinent to our study. The surveys do not track individuals over
time but rather sample a representative set of respondents in Britain with every
new survey iteration; therefore, we pool all responses and obtain a cross-sectional
sample of 3031 individuals, after removing respondent observations with missing
values. The data elicit attitudes towards a wide range of issues, and our key ex-
planatory variable is derived from respondents’ attitudes towards the welfare state
and welfare recipients, which is labelled welfarism. The individual questions that
enter the construction of this aggregate welfarism score capture the respondents’
views on whether 1) benefits discourage independence, 2) cutting benefits would
damage too many lives, 3) the government should spend more money on benefits,
1In the UK, in light of the considerable public spending on welfare, “throughout his premi-
ership, David Cameron, along with his chancellor, George Osborne, kept the opposition between
’hardworking people’ and lazy benefit claimants right at the centre of their messaging on spend-
ing cuts.” (de Vries & Reeves, 2017, in The Guardian).
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4) people on the dole fiddle or way or another, 5) the unemployed could find a
job if they really tried, 6) welfare discourages mutual support, 7) welfare recip-
ients do not really deserve any help and 8) the welfare state is one of Britain’s
proudest achievements. The possible answers lie on a 5-point Likert scale ran-
ging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”, which we map to the integers
1 to 5, where higher values indicate more favourable attitudes. Summing all an-
swers yield the respondents’ welfarism scores, ranging from 8 to 40; a composite
variable shown to be of high reliability (Curtice, Clery, Perry, Phillips & Rahim,
2019). Our main outcome variable derives from a direct survey question capturing
whether medical advice on a mental health problem has ever been sought, and we
map “yes” answers to the integer one, and “no” answers to zero. From the BSA
surveys, we further obtain key individual- and household-level characteristics, such
as holding a University degree, the household income (in logs), being married or
cohabitating, being female and living by oneself in a single household.
The relationship between high welfarism and mental health can be interpreted in
the light of the literature on social norm enforcement and social identity. Iden-
tity is understood as identification with a social category and acceptance of the
accompanying behaviours and attributions deemed appropriate. Accordingly, we
provide a theoretical framework to guide the investigation of the basic relation-
ship we posit in a simple extension of the model by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) to
the context of welfarism and mental health problems. We show that work-related
“identity norms” can cause mental health problems as a result of social sanctioning
following from the expressions of positive welfare attitudes. Specifically, mental
health problems can arise as individuals that express positive welfare attitudes
threaten other individuals in their social identities and, accordingly, become sanc-
tioned for their expression of welfare attitudes. The framework entails the testable
implication that social sanctioning increases as its cost decreases.
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Our empirical analysis begins by establishing the relationship between welfarism
and mental health problems. As descriptive evidence reveals evidence of non-
linearities in the relationship between welfarism and mental health problems, we
construct a high welfarism indicator variable that takes the value one for individu-
als in the top 30% of the welfarism score distribution, and zero otherwise. The
average marginal effects (AMEs) of 0.130 estimated from the baseline probit model
suggests that high welfarism is associated with an increase in the mental health
problem probability of 13 percentage points. In order to attenuate endogeneity
concerns and establish the direction of the potential bias in the baseline regression
of mental health problems on high welfarism, we further test the relationship in
a Maximum Likelihood framework in which we explicitly model the potentially
endogenous regressor, high welfarism. Specifically, we specify a two-stage recurs-
ive probit framework and identify the association between high welfarism and
mental health problems in two ways: 1) through the frameworks non-linearities
and 2) by instrumenting high welfarism with a set of dummy variables captur-
ing the respondents’ identification with political parties. Given the inclusion of
a wide range of control variables, the instruments in approach 2) likely meet the
instrumental variable relevance and exclusion restrictions. The obtained AME are
equal to 0.425 and 0.364, suggesting that endogeneity introduces a downward bias
in the baseline estimates, which thereby establish a lower bound on the effects. As
the non-linear and instrumental variable identification approaches yield the same
conclusions, our results do not rest on the validity of the instrumental variables.
Next, we exploit variation in the ruling governing party in the UK over time to
capture changing political environments for welfare and test the implication that
a reduction in the cost of sanctioning yields higher rates of mental health prob-
lems.2 By testing whether the link between high welfarism and mental health
2Insofar as changes in majorities of political parties reflect evolving voter preferences due to
economic conditions, our study is related to the economics literature on endogenous preferences
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problems intensifies under conservative rule, we provide evidence in favour of the
notion that expressing positive welfare attitudes can be sanctioned by other indi-
viduals as a result of them feeling threatened in their identities. Intuitively, when
the UK government is drawn from the conservative party, the typical result is a
political environment in which welfare spending and benefit recipients are viewed
less favourably - in its extreme, resulting in political scapegoating.3 We confirm
the testable implication of our theoretical framework by finding that when the
government is drawn from the conservative party, the relationship between high
welfarism and mental health problems intensifies.
To identify the role of identity, we further split individuals by whether their labour
market characteristics conform to work norms. Respondents that are employed or
receive no welfare benefits conform to the societal ideal that working is a norm-
ative good, thereby adhering to the social identities associated with the working
population. For these respondents, expressing positive welfare attitudes, consti-
tuting a deviation from their social identities, and can be sanctioned more strongly
by other individuals subscribing to the same identity. In harsher political envir-
onments towards welfare, this sanctioning can occur more frequently, given the
reduction in its cost. The regression results are consistent with these notions. Un-
der Tory governments, high conformity, high welfare individuals report a higher
prevalence of mental health problems (11.5 to 17.3 percentage point increase) than
low conformity, high welfare individuals (8.5 to 11.5 percentage points).
We further provide evidence on the role of gender in an additional set of analyses.
We find that the observed relationships are more pronounced for females than
(for example Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Bowles, 1998; Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012; Callen,
Isaqzadeh, Long & Sprenger, 2014; Giuliano & Spilimbergo, 2014; Malmendier & Nagel, 2011;
Tanaka, Camerer & Nguyen, 2010). However, we do not pursue this point in this study.
3For some welfare claimants, counter-intuitively, this can result in more negative views of
other welfare recipients, rather than an increased sense of solidarity with those in similar po-
sitions. The psychological literature labels this “cognitive distancing”: a psychological coping
mechanism to reconcile one’s welfare receipt with the negative public opinion of welfare (Lott,
2002; Reutter et al., 2009), such as the image of benefit scroungers.
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for males and that the gap in negative mental health outcomes increases between
genders for survey responses elicited under conservative governments versus labour
governments. Moreover, we document significant associations for high welfarism
individuals with reports of mental health problems and the notion that voting is a
duty, whereas these associations are not statistically significant, given no mental
health problems. The results of this analysis suggest that respondents finding
themselves worse off under conservative rule recognise voting as a mean to induce
societal change.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the related literature;
Section 2.3 presents our theoretical framework; Section 2.4 presents our data;
Section 2.5 describes the results of our empirical analysis; Section 2.6 provides
additional analysis on the role of gender and implications for attitudes towards
voting; Section 2.7 discusses limitations and future research; while Section 2.8
concludes.
2.2 Related literature
Mental health influences financial outcomes and is also affected by economic cir-
cumstances and choices. As cited in Balloch, Engels and Philip (2020), a wide
range of links exist between mental health and individual as well as macroeconomic
circumstances. First, mental health influences financial outcomes. In an influen-
tial study, Gathergood (2012) shows that problematic mortgage debt significantly
deteriorates mental health and is moderated by local house price movements that
buffer the severity of mortgage payment arrears. The dependence of mental health
outcomes on economic developments outside individual control are also developed
in (Grip et al., 2011), who show that unexpected pension reform with negative
implications on the individual income replacement rates in retirement affects the
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mental health of those close to the retirement age. More broadly, widening access
to credit has net positive effects on mental health outcomes (Karlan & Zinman,
2010); while recessions impact mental health negatively, with differential impacts
felt along the socio-economic gradient (Currie et al., 2015).
Second, financial outcomes are affected by mental health. Bogan and Fertig (2013)
show that asset allocation is significantly determined by mental health. For in-
stance, the share of household investments in risky assets, such as stock, mutual
funds and investment trusts, decreases as mental health deteriorates; whereas
single women increase their holdings of safe assets, such as, for example, savings
and money market accounts. Further, Bogan and Fertig (2018) find that mental
health problems decrease the individual likelihood to invest in retirement accounts
and build retirement savings. Berkowitz and Qiu (2006) find that health status
affects the allocation of household financial assets and is an important factor de-
termining households’ financial wealth. Further, Bogan, Fertig and Just (2019)
show that psychological distress makes it more difficult for individuals to retain
salaried jobs, thereby increasing the likelihood of self-employment. Balloch et
al. (2020) suggest that such distress negatively affects the ability to accumulate
wealth.
This thesis chapter is further related to the literature in identity economics that
originates from the seminal contribution by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). Studies
therein highlight the link between social identity and role of social norm enforce-
ment (Bernhard et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2006); the effect of ethnic, racial, and
gender category norms on time and risk preferences (Benjamin, Choi & Strickland,
2010); the link between personal identity and moral choices (Bénabou & Tirole,
2011); the effects of gender identity on the relative distribution of household in-
comes and marriage quality (Bertrand, Kamenica & Pan, 2015); and how identity
influences consumption decisions (Bursztyn, Ferman, Fiorin, Kanz & Rao, 2017).
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The social categories of workers and benefit scroungers are consistent with the
pronounced and universal emphasis of the normative value of work in developed
countries. In a theoretical analysis, (Lindbeck et al., 1999) show that both social
norms and economic incentives determine the decision whether to take up welfare.
Specifically, the social norm under consideration is that to be economically self-
sufficient and use own earnings to sustain oneself. The larger the share of welfare
recipient, the less pronounced this social norm becomes. Lindbeck et al. (2003)
continue to how economic incentives and such social norms to work affect the
endogenous determination of social insurance. Their findings suggest that if the
norm to work is weakened through a higher share of welfare recipient, voters
will decrease the generosity of welfare payment and the welfare stigma increases
(Moffitt, 1983; Pescosolido & Martin, 2015).
2.3 Theoretical framework
In this section, we provide a simple theoretical framework, extending the model
by Akerlof and Kranton (2000): we define the social categories of “worker” and
“benefit scrounger” and analyse the game-theoretic interaction between two indi-
viduals, showing how mental health problems can arise as a result of the expression
of welfare attitudes, which can attract sanctioning by others. We further derive
a simple theoretical implication that we test in the empirical analysis of Section
2.5.
2.3.1 Social sanctions and mental health
In the following, we follow the notation by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). In our
analysis, two social categories exist: worker and benefit scrounger, which we col-
lect in the vector C = (worker, benefit scrounger)′. Workers have a higher social
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status than benefit scroungers. Each social category entails prescriptions, P , that
indicate what behaviours or characteristics are appropriate for members of the
given social category. In our context, these include, for instance, that workers
stand on their own two feet and do not claim benefits to support their livelihoods.
In contrast, the attributes of benefit scroungers include claiming benefits and liv-
ing off the work of others.4 Social identities then refer to which social categories
individuals assign themselves and others.
Given these social identities, the expression of positive welfare attitudes, which we
label high welfarism, by a given individual, HW j, and by others, HW−j, influence
utility directly, but also indirectly through their effects in the context of j’s own
social identity, Ij:
Uj = Uj(HW j, HW−j, Ij) (2.1)
Ij = Ij(HW j, HW−j | cj, ϵj,P) (2.2)
In particular, Equation 2.2 can be interpreted as utility externalities that arise
from choices to express or not to express high welfarism, conditional on the as-
signments by j of herself and others to social categories, cj, and the extent to
which j conforms to her own social identity, ϵj. Depending on the particular so-
cial identity assignments, the effects on utility differ given whether a worker or a
benefit scrounger express their attitudes to welfare.
Given these effects of others’ choices in light of social identity, a simple game-
theoretic interaction serves to show how workers can face incentives to sanction
other workers that express high welfarism, as a result of feeling threatened in their
identity. Sanctioning offending workers then restores the loss in self-image. The
4It is also reflected in the design of welfare programmes. For example, the UK’s Department
for Work and Pensions (2020) states that its new welfare system, “[Universal Credit,] has been
introduced to give you the support you need to find and progress in work. We want you to be
able to benefit from all the positives that work brings.” (p. 1) This is suggestive of the view that
benefit claimants have an innate aversion to work.
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sanctioned workers consequently suffer a resulting utility loss due to an increase
in mental health problems.
Specifically, let there be two workers, i and j. Worker i does not hold positive
views on welfare and earns zero utility from expressing positive views. Worker j
does hold positive welfare views, or high welfarism HW , and earns utility V (HW )
from expressing her attitudes; otherwise, she earns a utility of zero. Further, let
both i and j correctly think of themselves and the other as workers, where worker
identities entail the subscription, P , that “workers should earn their income” and
“only benefit scroungers receive welfare and live off the work of others”. So anyone
who expresses views contrary to these subscriptions is in violation of the worker
identity. In j’s case, this would induce a loss in identity of Is, where the subscript
“s” stands for self.
If i and j are paired in social interaction, expressing positive welfare attitudes on
the part of j diminishes i’s worker identity and i has a loss in utility Io where
the subscript “o” stands for “others.” This identity externality equals zero if j
does not express any positive welfare attitudes. After observing that j expressed
positive welfare attitudes, i may respond by sanctioning j at an effort, e. This
causes j to incur utility losses due to deterioration in her mental health, MH.
Figure 2.1 represents this interaction between individual i and j. j can choose
to express her high welfarism, HW , while i can decide to engage in sanctioning
this expression at an effort, e. This game tree has four important subgame perfect
equilibria (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). First, consider the case in which the identity
cost of expressing high welfarism is greater than the utility earned from such
expression, V (HW ) < Is. In this case, j does not express her views and i is not
faced with the decision of whether to sanction j. She then earns zero utility, while
i earns her baseline utility, V . Second, assume that for j the utility earned from
expressing high welfarism is greater than the identity costs incurred, V (HW ) > Is,
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and that for i the effort to sanction j is greater than identity externalities incurred,
Io < e. In this case, j expresses her views and earns utility V (HW ) − Is while i
does not sanction j and earns utility V − Io.
Now assume that for j the utility earned from expressing high welfarism is greater
than the identity costs incurred, V (HW ) > Is, and that for i it is more costly
to suffer identity externalities than to engage in the effort to sanction i, Io > e.
Two further equilibrium outcomes are possible depending on the utility cost that
sanctioning imposes on j. On the one hand, in case of the third outcome, if the
utility net identity cost is greater than the mental health cost of being sanctioned,
V (HW )−Is > MH, j will express her views and earn utility V (HW )−Is−MH >
0. On the other hand, in case of the fourth outcome, if utility after accounting
for sanctioning is less than zero, she will refuse to express her views and earn zero
utility. Accordingly, i will earn utility V − e or V , respectively.
2.3.2 Testable implication
The model outlined in the previous section yields an implication that we will test
empirically in the next sections. Specifically, consider that the model posits that
sanctioning, in response to expressions of high welfarism, HW , by other workers,
does not occur if its cost, e, is greater than the identity externalities incurred
otherwise: e > Io.
Now, consider a reduction in the costs of social sanctions. If these costs decrease,
and it remains an optimal decision to express high welfarism after accounting for
social sanctions, some workers that ignored expressions of high welfarism before
will now find it optimal to sanction others. Consequently, an increase in mental




The empirical test in the later sections amounts to confirming an increase in mental
health problems for high welfarism individuals as the cost of sanctioning reduces.
The empirical challenge lies in identifying factors that plausibly reduce the cost of
engaging in sanctioning for those workers that suffer identity externalities. One
such factor we will consider is the variation in the political environment with
respect to welfare friendliness due to changes in the governing parties.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Data sample
We use data from the British Social Attitudes (BSA) surveys: a repeated cross-
sectional survey, where a new set of respondents is obtained with every survey,
representative of the attitudes of the British population towards a variety of so-
cietal issues. The majority of questions that are asked change year-to-year, yet
some are periodically repeated to enable comparisons of attitudes over time. The
years 2000, 2003, 2006, 2007 and 2013 contain repetitions of the questions that
collect the information we are interested in: respondents’ answers on questions
concerning welfare recipients and the welfare state, mental health problems and
socio-economic information, including detailed information on employment status
and welfare receipt. As the BSA series of surveys do not have a panel dimension,
we pool these years. After excluding observations with missing data in our baseline
set of variables, we are left with a cross-sectional data sample of 3031 respondent
observations for analysis.
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2.4.2 Variable descriptions and summary statistics
Table 2.1 shows the descriptions and summary statistics (mean, minimum, max-
imum and standard deviation) for the variables in our data sample. The following
subsections provide descriptions of our key explanatory variable, welfarism, our
key outcome variable, mental health problems, as well as other individual- and
household-level characteristics.
2.4.2.1 Welfarism
The key explanatory variable is labelled welfarism; a scale commonly used in the
BSA data. Curtice et al. (2019) test the scale for reliability using Cronbach’s
alpha and find it to be highly reliable. It captures respondents’ overall welfare
attitudes and is derived from eight questions which that the respondents’ degree
of agreement or disagreement regarding various aspects of the welfare state and
welfare recipients. Specifically, these questions capture the respondents’ views on
whether 1) benefits discourage independence, 2) cutting benefits would damage too
many lives, 3) the government should spend more money on benefits, 4) people on
the dole fiddle or way or another, 5) the unemployed could find a job if they really
tried, 6) welfare discourages mutual support, 7) welfare recipients do not really
deserve any help and 8) the welfare state is one of Britan’s proudest achievements.
The possible answers lie on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree”
to “strongly agree”, which we map to the integers 1 to 5, where higher values
indicate more favourable attitudes. Summing all answers yield the respondents’
welfarism scores, ranging from 8 to 40, which, unlike the scale used in Curtice
et al. (2019), we do not divide by eight to retain variability in the data. The mean
score in our data equals 23.84, which amounts to 49.5% (≈ (23.84− 8)/(40− 8))
of the maximum positive overall welfare attitude.
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2.4.2.2 Mental health problems
The key outcome in our analysis is the mental health problems variable. The BSA
asks a direct question as to whether medical advice on a mental health problem has
ever been sought, and we map “yes” answers to the integer one, and “no” answers
to zero. This binary measure is easy to administer and therefore available in six
BSA surveys. However, Bogan and Fertig (2018) use a similar question in their
study of how mental health affects retirement savings behaviour and point out a
number of limitations of this measurement approach, many of which apply in this
context. In particular, the nature, timing and intensity of the mental health issue
in question is not elicited and, because the question requires engagement with a
medical practitioner, it captures socio-economic along with mental health status.
Attenuating the timing issue – having ever sought medical advice – Aneshensel,
Estrada, Hansell and Clark (1987) find that self-reports of lifetime diagnosis are
often inconsistent over time and are more likely to capture a current diagnosis
than a past diagnosis, which facilitates the analysis of trends in the changes of the
answer distribution over time. Due to data limitations, we make use of this variable
in our analysis; and recognizing its limitations, Table 2.1 indicates a prevalence of
mental health problems in our sample of 33%.
2.4.2.3 Other characteristics
Table 2.1 reports a further set of individual- and household-level characteristics
used in our analysis. It indicates that 19% of respondents obtained University
education. Income is captured at the household-level and converted to lie on
the logarithmic scale. 57% of respondents are either married or living with their
partner, and 56% of respondents are female. The average age of respondents in
our sample is 47.47 years; the youngest respondent is 21 years old, and the oldest
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is aged 65. Approximately 29% of respondents live in a household by themselves.
We further include a set of indicator variables that capture the respondents’ iden-
tifications with UK political parties. One-fifth (20%) of respondents report that
they do not identify with any political party, under one-third (28%) report identi-
fication with the conservative party, while approximately one-third (35%) report
identification with the labour party, and under one-fifth (17%) with another party.
2.4.3 Descriptive evidence
In Figure 2.2, we begin by investigating the relationship between welfarism and
mental health problems visually. The horizontal axis shows the full range of pos-
sible welfarism scores, while the vertical axis shows the average of the mental
health problem variable in percentage points. Therefore, each dot in Figure 2.2
represents the prevalence of mental health problems at the given welfarism score
estimated in our data sample. The dashed line indicates the fitted values obtained
from the LOESS smoother, together with the 95% confidence intervals.
Three observations emerge from Figure 2.2. First, there appears to be a positive
association between welfarism scores and mental health problems. Second, while
the slope appears flat for the lower range of welfarism scores, it turns decidedly
positive for higher scores. Third, the confidence intervals slightly widen for very
high or very low welfarism scores, reflecting the lower number of respondents with
welfarism scores in these regions of the distribution. Overall, this descriptive
evidence suggests that welfarism scores and mental health problems are positively
associated; specifically, when comparing the effects across the low and high region
of welfarism scores.
In Figure 2.3, we provide the first evidence in support of the proposed mechanism
that sanctioning of individuals can provide an explanation for the link underly-
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ing the relationship between welfarism and mental health problems. Intuitively,
a political environment less favourable to welfare recipients and positive welfare
views should increase the degree of sanctioning as the associated sanctioning costs
reduce, thereby resulting in higher prevalence of mental health problems. Ac-
cordingly, Figure 2.3 plots the relationship between welfarism and mental health
problems, where both dots and fitted values our split accordingly to the type of
political party providing the government.
Two observations summarise Figure 2.3: first, we observe that the prevalence of
mental health problems is significantly higher when the conservative party provides
the government than when the labour party does so. Second, while the relation-
ship between welfarism and mental health problems appears stable in low regions
of the welfarism distribution, the trends diverge for higher scores. In the case of
a conservative government, the positive slope is increasing with higher welfarism
scores; in contrast, the slope is flattening in the same region of welfarism scores
under labour governments. This evidence suggests the possibility that social sanc-
tioning increases under conservative rule.
2.5 Empirical analysis
2.5.1 Welfare attitudes and mental health problems
We begin by establishing the baseline association between reports of high wel-
farism and mental health problems in a multivariate regression framework that
controls for important confounding influences at the individual- and household-
level. Moreover, as the relationship between welfarism and mental health problems
is likely subject to endogeneity concerns, such as reverse causality or omitted vari-
able bias, we attempt to identify the direction of potential bias introduced in
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the baseline regression estimates by employing a Limited Information Maximum
Likelihood (LIML) framework.
To do so, we specify the following set of recursive probit equations:
MHi = 1(α + γHWi +X
′
iθ + εi > 0) (2.3)




iϕ+ ηi > 0), (2.4)
with the following error term structure:
(εi, ηi)




where i is the respondent-level identifier and 1(·) is the indicator function, taking
the value one if its argument is true and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in
Equation (2.3) is the indicator variable capturing mental health problems (MH),
and the explanatory variable of interest is the high welfarism indicator (HW ,
defined as scores in the top 30% of the welfarism score distribution). The depend-
ent variable in Equation (2.4) is the high welfarism indicator, and the explanatory
variables of interest are a set of instrumental variables, Z, to be specified. The
error terms in Equations (2.3) and (2.4) are related to each other in a Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SUR) specification, parametrised as a multivariate normal
distribution with covariance matrix Σ, where the variances are constrained to
unity as a result of the probit normalization assumption. The parameter ρ cap-
tures the correlation between the error terms. The vector X captures important
individual- and household-level characteristics, such as holding a University de-
gree, the household income (in logs), being married or cohabitating, being female,
the respondents age in levels and squares, as well as living by oneself in a single
household, together with year dummies capturing time fixed effects.
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This framework amounts to an instrumental variable approach for binary lim-
ited dependent variables in the first and second stage, Equation (2.3) and (2.4),
respectively. It is attractive for several reasons. First, if the requirements for
valid instrumental variables are met, the parameter of interest, γ, quantifies the
relationship between HW and MH free of bias. Second, the joint estimation of
the parameter ρ returns an estimate capturing the presence of endogeneity in the
relationship between HW and MH. Specifically, conditional on HW , X and Z,
an omitted driver of both HW and MH will introduce a non-zero correlation in
the error terms of equation one and two, ρ ̸= 0. We will obtain an estimate of
ρ, thereby allowing for statistical testing of endogeneity. Third, Equation (2.3) is
identified even if the elements of the vector δ are restricted to zero, amounting to
the removal of the instrumental variables from the first stage equation. In this
special case, the source of identification can originate from the specific form of the
model’s non-linearity (Mourifié & Méango, 2014; Roodman, 2011; Wilde, 2000).
Importantly, identification of the parameter γ can thus be obtained when no ap-
propriate instrumental variables suggest themselves, or the ones that are available
do not unambiguously satisfy the instrumental variable requirements.
As instruments for high welfarism, we consider three binary variables, which take
the value one if political identification with the conservative party, the labour
party or another party, respectively, is reported, and zero otherwise. These three
variables are likely to satisfy the requirements for valid instruments. In the UK,
political party identification is strongly associated with varying degrees of welfare
attitudes. For instance, members of the conservative party are known to hold less
favourable views on welfare and benefit receipt, while supporters of the labour
party hold more favourable views. Other parties exhibit heterogeneous stances on
welfare. Therefore, we expect a strong first stage association – in other words,
meeting of the instrumental variable relevance conditions – between the political
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party identifiers (Z) and the indicator variable capturing high welfarism (HW ).
We test for this strong first-stage empirically. Moreover, it appears unlikely that
after controlling for the age, income and university education, political party iden-
tification infers a relationship with reports of mental health problems (MH) sep-
arate from its effect through (HW ). Therefore, these political party identifiers are
likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction for valid instrumental variables. Together
the meeting of the relevance and exclusion restrictions constitute an instrumental
variable approach to estimating the relationship between HW and MH in which
endogeneity concerns are attenuated.
We estimate the association between HW and MH in three different ways. First,
we obtain simple probit estimates by individually estimating Equation (1); second,
we estimate Equations (1) to (3) without the inclusion of the instrumental vari-
ables; and third, we estimate Equations (1) to (3) and include the instrumental
variables in the first stage regression. Table 2.2 reports the results, where Columns
(1) to (3) show those for these different approaches, reflecting a successive increase
in model complexity. The reported estimates are average marginal effects (AMEs).
In Column (1), the estimate of the relationship between HW and MH suggests
that a unit increase in HW is associated with a 0.130 percentage point increase
of P (MH = 1). The baseline predicted probability of 0.335 indicates that this
amounts to an approximately 30% increase versus the baseline. In Column (2),
in which the first-stage regression of controls only is jointly estimated, the estim-
ated association between W and MH increases to 0.425 percentage points. The
estimates of ρ and their corresponding 95% confidence intervals indicates that the
null of no endogeneity between HW and MH is rejected at the 10% level. This
indicates that the estimates obtained from the simple probit regression in Column
(1) are subject to bias. However, as the magnitude of the association is smaller
in Column (1), we conclude that endogeneity introduces a downward bias. In
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Column (3), in which HW is instrumented with the political party identifiers in
Z, we observe that the association between HW and MH equals 0.364, approxim-
ately in line with the results from Column (2) but greater than those of Column
(1). The first-stage F-statistic of 31.994 indicates a strong first-stage regression.
Therefore, weak identification appears to not be a concern. The unreported first-
stage coefficients of the instrumental variables are all strongly significant. Overall,
the estimates in Table 2.2 reveal a strong association between HW and MH. Fur-
ther, as endogeneity introduces a downward bias in the baseline estimates of this
relationship, the estimations reported in the following sections constitute lower
bounds of any the estimated associations.
2.5.2 Variation in sanctioning costs
We now turn to testing the implication of the theoretical framework described
in Section 2.3. When the UK government is drawn from the conservative party,
the typical result is a political environment in which welfare spending and benefit
recipients are viewed less favourably - in its extreme, resulting in political scape-
goating. In such a context, the cost of social sanctioning reduces. Individuals
that are employed or receive no welfare benefits conform to the societal ideal that
working is a normative good, thereby adhering to the social identities associated
with the working population. Expressing positive welfare attitudes, constituting a
deviation from the social identity that purports the normative value of work, will
be sanctioned by other individuals subscribing to the same identity. In harsher
political environments towards welfare that reduce the cost of sanctioning, the
theoretical framework implies that it will occur at higher frequencies, manifesting
in higher rates of mental health problems.
We exploit variation in the ruling governing party in the UK over time to capture
changing political environments for welfare. By testing whether the link between
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high welfarism and mental health problems intensifies under conservative rule, we
provide evidence in favour of the notion that expressing positive welfare attitudes
can be sanctioned by other individuals as a result of them feeling threatened in
their identities.
We construct an indicator variable (Ct) that takes the value 1 if the UK gov-
ernment at time t is drawn from the conservative party, and 0 otherwise. We
interact this Tory government variable with the high welfarism indicator (HW )
and estimate the relationship of these interactions with the mental health problem
variable (MH). To capture the differing intensities of sanctioning for high and low
conformity individuals, we estimate the relationships for G different subgroup of
respondents, described in more detail below, where g is the group-level identifier.
The following probit model is estimated separately for each group:
MHi = 1(αg + γ1(Ct) + γ2(HWi) + γ3(HWi × Ct) +X ′iθ + εi > 0),
∀i ∈ {i | sg(i) = 1}, (2.6)
where sg(i) takes the value 1 if the respondent i belongs to group g, and zero
otherwise. The indicator function 1(·) takes the value one if its argument is true
and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in Equation (2.6) is the indicator
variable capturing mental health problems (MH), and the explanatory variable
of interest is the high welfarism indicator (HW ). The error term εi follows a
standard normal distribution. The vector X captures important individual- and
household-level characteristics, such as holding a University degree, the household
income (in logs), being married or cohabitating, being female, the respondents’
ages in levels and squares and living by oneself in a single household. The year
fixed effects are collinear with the interactions of interest and therefore excluded
from estimation.
82
2.5.2. Variation in sanctioning costs
We consider six respondent subgroups (G = 6) that are not mutually exclusive.
The first three groups comprise respondents of high conformity with the norm-
ative value of work. The first of these groups includes respondents that are in
employment, while the second group includes those that are not in receipt of wel-
fare benefits, whereas respondents in the third group are both in employment and
receive no benefits. The second three groups include respondents of low conform-
ity with societal work norms. Respondents in these groups include, respectively,
those that are not in employment, are in receipt of welfare benefits and are both
not in employment and receive benefits. Accordingly, Table 2.3 reports the estim-
ation results, where Columns (1) to (6) report the estimates corresponding to the
respective subgroups.
Several important observations emerged from Table 2.3. It can be seen that for
high welfarism individuals, conservative political party rule is associated with
higher coefficient estimates. Tests for the differences between the coefficients un-
der labour and conservative governments indicate a strong rejection of the null
hypothesis that of equality of effects. This suggests that the relationship between
welfarism and mental health problems intensifies under conservative rule and, im-
portantly, the differences across columns indicate that this occurs disproportion-
ately so for high conformity individuals. Overall, these estimates provide evidence
in favour of the possibility that high welfarism is sanctioned more strongly in en-
vironments less friendly to the welfare state and welfare recipients.This confirms
the implication from the theoretical framework from Section 2.3 that reductions in
sanctioning costs increase mental health problems, and contributes social norm en-
forcement as a factor influencing mental health to the pertinent literature (Bridges




2.6.1 The role of gender
Research has documented significant gender differences in the propensity to ex-
perience mental health issues (Afifi, 2007). Given this disproportionate suscept-
ibility to developing mental health issues, we test the notion that the relationship
between welfarism and mental health problems manifests unequally between male
and females.
We begin by estimating the following probit model in which we interact the indic-
ator variable taking the value one for female respondents, and zero for male ones
(F ) with the respondents’ welfarism scores (W ):
MHi = 1(α + γ1(Fi ×Wi) + γ2((1− Fi)×Wi) +X ′iθ + εi > 0) (2.7)
where i is the respondent-level identifier. The indicator function 1(·) takes the
value one if its argument is true and zero otherwise. Again, the dependent vari-
able in Equation (2.7) is the indicator variable capturing mental health problems
(MH). The error term εi follows a standard normal distribution. The vector
X includes the control variables capturing an indicator for an obtained Univer-
sity degree, the household income (in logs), being married or cohabitating, the
respondents’ ages in levels and squares and living by oneself in a single household,
as well as time dummies to capture time fixed effects.
Table 2.4 reports the estimation results. The coefficient estimates suggest that
mental health problems increase as welfarism increases, for both males and fe-
males; however, though both estimates are highly significant, the magnitude of
increase is greater for females. This greater gradient in the relationship between
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high welfarism and mental health problems for females is in line with research
suggesting that women are more likely to suffer from mental health issues such as
anxiety (Angst & Dobler-Mikola, 1985; Bruce et al., 2005; McLean, Asnaani, Litz
& Hofmann, 2011) and depression (Nolen-Hoeksema & Girgus, 1994; Piccinelli &
Wilkinson, 2000). As such, these results indicate one possible explanation regard-
ing the differential likelihood in mental health problems for females versus males:
females may be at higher risk of social sanctioning when they express positive
welfare attitudes.
In order to provide economic magnitudes for the estimation results, we obtain the
predicted probabilities across the full range of welfarism scores for both males and
females. Figure 2.4 presents the results, where the welfarism scores are depicted on
the horizontal axis, while the predicted probabilities are reported on the vertical
axis. The black triangles show the predicted probabilities for females, while the
white triangles show those for males. The error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals. It can be seen from Figure 2.4 that, while the predicted probabilities
for males and females do not differ for very low welfarism scores, continuously
increasing differences manifest as welfarism scores increase. Figure 2.4 thus implies
that 1) the predicted probabilities for females are higher than for males across
the majority of the welfarism score distribution and 2) the association between
welfarism scores and mental health problems is stronger for females than it is for
males. Overall, these results suggest support for the notion that the observed
relationship between welfarism and mental health problems manifest unequally
for females and males.
In order to shed further light on the notion that females may be more susceptible
to social sanctioning, we further investigate the differential associations across
gender under the different types of political rule. To do so, we make use of the
indicator variable Ct that takes the value 1 if the UK government at time t is
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drawn from the conservative party, and 0 otherwise, and estimate the following
probit model:
MHi = 1(α + γ1((1− Fi)× (1− Ct)×Wi)
+ γ2((1− Fi)× Ct ×Wi)
+ γ3(Fi × (1− Ct)×Wi)
+ γ4(Fi × Ct ×Wi) +X ′iθ + εi > 0) (2.8)
where i is again the individual identifier, F is the indicator capturing female re-
spondents and W denotes welfarism scores. The indicator function 1(·) takes the
value one if its argument is true and zero otherwise. The error term εi follows a
standard normal distribution. The vector X includes the control variables cap-
turing an indicator for an obtained University degree, the household income (in
logs), the respondents’ ages in levels and squares, being married or cohabitating
and living by oneself in a single household. The time dummies are collinear with
the interactions of interest and are therefore excluded from the estimation.
Table 2.5 reports the estimation results. The triple interaction of the female in-
dicator, Tory government indicator and welfarism scores is highly significant in
all cases and shows that the greatest susceptibility to mental health problems as
welfarism scores increase is faced under Tory government rule, for both males and
females. However, the gradient for males under Tory government is approximately
equal those for females when non-Tory parties rule. To aid the economic inter-
pretation of these estimation results, we again obtain the predicted probabilities
for the full range of welfarism scores for both males, females and by whether the
ruling party is drawn from the conservative or labour party, respectively. Fig-
ure 2.5 presents the results. Panel (a) shows the results for labour governments,
while Panel (b) shows those for conservative governments. The welfarism scores
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are depicted on the horizontal axis, while the predicted probabilities are repor-
ted on the vertical axis. The black triangles show the predicted probabilities for
females, while the white triangles show those for males. The error bars indicate
95% confidence intervals.
The results mirror those for Figure 2.4: while the predicted probabilities for males
and females do not differ for very low welfarism scores under both ruling parties,
continuously increasing differences manifest as welfarism scores increase. However,
visual inspection of the differences between Panel (a) and (b) reveal that the gap
between the predicted probabilities for females and males is notably greater under
conservative than under labour party rule. This suggests that the relationship
between welfarism and mental health problems disproportionally intensifies for
females when the conservative party governs.
2.6.2 Voting for change
Having provided evidence on a significant link between welfarism and mental
health problems, and that this relationship intensifies under conservative polit-
ical governments, we turn our investigation to one possible response open to in-
dividuals: using their votes in elections to induce political change. If individual
circumstances worsen under the policies and rhetoric of the incumbent political
party, it appears likely that individuals recognise the importance of voting in order
to bring on changes in the political system. Therefore, the possibility exists that
individuals with high welfarism who report a higher prevalence of mental health
problems will exhibit more favourable attitudes to voting participation.
The 2000 and 2013 BSA surveys provide a measure of the respondents’ attitudes
toward voting. Respondents indicate whether they believe that either 1) it is
not worth voting, 2) that voting only matters if they care about who wins or 3)
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whether voting is a duty. We capture responses in the ordinal variable V where
the lowest outcome refers to voting not being worth it, while the highest to the
belief that voting is a duty. In order to understand how the combinations of high
welfarism and mental health problems relate to voting attitudes, we estimate the
following ordered probit model:
Vi = g(α + γ1(MHi) + γ2(HWi) + γ3(HWi ×MHi) +X ′iθ + εi) (2.9)
g(v∗) =

“Not worth voting” if −∞ < v∗ ≤ c1
“Vote if care who wins” if c1 < v∗ ≤ c2
“Duty to vote” if c2 < v∗ <∞
(2.10)
where i denotes individuals and g(·) is the ordered probit link function (Roodman,
2011). The error term in Equation (2.9), εi, follows a standard normal distribution.
The vector X includes the control variables capturing an indicator for an obtained
University degree, the household income (in logs), being married or cohabitating,
being female, the respondents ages’ in levels and squares and living by oneself in
a single household, as well as time dummies to capture time fixed effects.
After estimation of the model in Equation (2.9), we obtain the average marginal
effects (AMEs) for high welfarism, separated by reports of mental health problems.
Table 2.6 presents the results. The columns show the AMEs for relating to the
three possible outcomes for the voting attitudes variable; Columns (1) to (3) show
the AMEs for positive reports of mental health problems and Columns (4) to (6) for
negative ones. Two important trends become apparent in Table 2.6. First, for no
reports of mental health problems, all coefficient estimates for high welfarism are
not significant at the 10% level. In contrast, in the case of reports of mental health
problems, all high welfarism estimates are strongly significant. This suggests that
the combination of high welfarism and mental health problems is associated with
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changing attitudes towards voting. Second, turning to the specific estimates of
these significant associations, Column (1) shows that the probability of reporting
that voting is not worth it reduces by 8.88 percentage points for high welfarism,
while Column (2) suggests an associated reduction of the probability that voting
only matters if they care about who wins by 4.49 percentage points. Accordingly,
Column (3) shows that high welfarism is associated with an increased probability
of reporting a duty to vote by 13.7 percentage points.
Thus, the results in Table 2.6 provide evidence of more favourable attitudes to-
wards voting for high welfarism individuals reporting mental health problems,
thereby suggesting the existence of respondent tendencies to vote for political
change in response to adverse circumstances.
2.7 Limitations and future research
Our findings identify a need for further research. Though we provide evidence
on the possible existence of the sanctioning of high welfarism individuals for de-
viating from societal norms that posit the normative value of work, sanctioning
is fundamentally unobservable in this analysis and thus remains latent. Future
research that explicitly measures whether respondents are subject to sanctioning
through survey questions can address this concern, thereby building on the empir-
ical results that this work contributes to the literature, in which the sanctioning
mechanism is identified through variation in incumbent governing parties and the
associated differences in the ideological majority these different periods of political
rule imply.
In addition, a limitation of this study is the lack of observing respondents across
different survey iterations. Though our empirical analysis controls for import-
ant confounding factors – and takes steps to mitigate endogeneity concerns in an
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instrumental variable approach and by controlling for endogenous relationships
parametrically – caution should be taken when assigning a causal interpretation
to these findings. The results do not provide conclusive evidence that fostering
more positive individual welfare attitudes will attract sanctioning and subsequent
deteriorations in mental health. Future work could result from an effort to include
measures of welfare attitudes in major longitudinal surveys, such as the Under-
standing Society and British Household Panel Survey. Time-ordered data would
enable the measuring of changes in welfare attitudes and subsequent changes in
mental health outcomes.
With respect to gender, further work could investigate the relationship between
welfarism and mental health problems for non-binary gender identities and identify
the exact channels that result in the differential effects across gender uncovered
in this study. Finally, future work marrying the measurement of welfare atti-
tudes to an existing longitudinal survey could provide important granular data
on individual mental health; information that is already routinely elicited. For
instance, together with welfare attitudes, respondents’ perceptions of their mental
health at the time of the survey could be queried, capturing specific mental health
dimensions together with their experienced intensity.
2.8 Conclusion
In this study, we study the link between positive attitudes to the welfare state
and benefit recipients (welfarism) and mental health problems. A set of empirical
characteristics transpire from the data. First, we establish a strong association
between high welfarism (defined as scores in the top 30% of the welfarism score
distribution) and reports of mental health problems. The results from the empir-
ical analysis indicate that the likely presence of endogeneity in this relationship
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introduces a downward bias in the baseline results; as such, the results of this study
can be interpreted as measurements of lower bounds on the proposed relationships.
Second, we show that the relationship between high welfarism and mental health
problems intensifies under conservative governments, disproportionally so for in-
dividuals exhibiting high conformity with work-related social norms, displayed
through being in employment or receiving no benefits. Third, we find that the
observed relationships are more pronounced for females than for males and that
the gap in negative mental health outcomes increases between genders for sur-
vey responses elicited under conservative governments versus labour governments.
Fourth, we document significant associations for high welfarism individuals with
reports of mental health problems and the notion that voting is a duty, whereas
these associations are not statistically significant given no mental health problems.
The results have direct implications for policy makers. The evidence that the
relationship between welfarism and mental health problems intensifies when the
government is drawn from the Conversative party, who is known to be harsher on
welfare, indicates that the political majority can influence how acceptable it is to
reprimand individuals for perceived deviations from everyday social norms. The
easier social sanctioning, the greater the ill effects on mental health are expected to
become. Refraining from political scapegoating, as in the case of welfare recipients
or other groups of society, and thereby increasing the cost of social sanctioning
suggests itself as a way that policy makers can have direct influence on the mental
health of its citizenry.
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Figure 2.1
Game tree interaction between individuals i and j
This game tree shows the interactions between workers i and j in an adaption of the
model by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). Individual j derives utility V (HW ) from
expressing high welfarism, HW , and utility 0 if she does not express these positive
welfare attitudes. In contrast, individual i does not hold positive welfare attitudes
and gains no utility from expressing positive views; V is her baseline utility. Is
denotes the costs to the worker identity as a result of expressing positive welfare
attitudes, while Io denotes the resulting identity-externalities born by others. The
effort involved in sanctioning is denoted e, while MH is the mental health utility




















Welfarism and mental health problems
This figure shows the relationship between welfarism and mental health problems.
The horizontal axis reports welfarism on a scale from 8 to 40, where higher val-
ues indicate more positive welfare attitudes. Each dot represents the prevalence
of mental health problems in percentage points at the respective level of welfar-
ism. The dashed line shows the fitted values obtained from the LOESS smoother,


























Welfarism and mental health problems by ruling political party
This figure shows the relationship between welfarism and mental health problems,
split by the ruling political party in the given survey year. The horizontal axis
reports welfarism on a scale from 8 to 40, where higher values indicate more
positive welfare attitudes. Each square represents the prevalence of mental health
problems in percentage points at the respective level of welfarism. The dashed
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Figure 2.4
Welfarism, mental health problems and gender
This figure visualises average predicted probabilities. The horizontal axis shows
welfarism on a scale from 8 to 40, where higher values indicate more positive wel-
fare attitudes. Each dot represents the average predicted probability obtained at
the respective level of welfarism. The solid line reports the predicted probabilities

























Gender and the political environment
This figure visualises average predicted probabilities. The horizontal axis shows welfarism on a scale from 8 to 40, where
higher values indicate more positive welfare attitudes. Each dot represents the average predicted probability obtained
at the respective level of welfarism. The solid line reports the predicted probabilities for females, while the dashed
line reports those for males. Panel (a) shows the relationship under labour governments; Panel (b) under conservative
governments. The error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
(a) Labour government (b) Tory government
























Variable descriptions and summary statistics
This table reports the variable descriptions and summary statistics for the data sample. The data is sourced from the British
Social Attitudes surveys in the years 2000, 2003, 2006, 2007 and 2013.
Variable Description Mean Min. Max. SD
Welfarism Captures welfare attitudes, higher answers indicate more positive views 23.84 8.00 40.00 5.03
Mental health problem =1 if ever sought medical advice on mental health problem, =0 otherwise 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.47
University education =1 if university education obtained, =0 otherwise 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.39
Household income Household income converted to log scale 9.91 8.29 10.93 0.77
Married or cohabitating =1 if married or cohabitating, =0 otherwise 0.57 0.00 1.00 0.50
Female =1 if female, =0 if male 0.56 0.00 1.00 0.50
Age Age in years 47.47 21.00 65.00 14.23
Single household =1 if one person household, =0 otherwise 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.45
No party identification =1 if no party identification, =0 otherwise 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.40
Conservative party identification =1 if Conservative party identification, =0 otherwise 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.45
Labour party identification =1 if Labour party identification, =0 otherwise 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.48




The relation between welfarism and mental health problems
This table reports average marginal effects (AMEs). The dependent variable is an
indicator capturing the presence of mental health problems. High welfarism takes the
value one for scores in the top 30% of the distribution, and zero otherwise. Column
(1) shows the AMEs for the baseline probit model; Column (2) shows those for the
two-stage probit model achieving identification through the model’s non-linearity; and
Column (3) shows those for the two stage probit model using an instrumental variable
approach. In Column (2), the first stage involves a probit regression of high welfarism
on the model controls, while in Column (3), three instrumental variables are included
that capture political affiliation with the conservative, labour or other parties. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. The stars ***, ** and * denote levels of significance











High welfarism 0.130*** 0.425*** 0.364***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
University degree 0.045** -0.029 -0.010
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Household income 0.012 0.035*** 0.030**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Married or cohabitating 0.010 0.039* 0.033
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Female 0.096*** 0.088*** 0.093***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Single household 0.061** 0.072*** 0.072***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Year f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Baseline predicted probability 0.335 0.364 0.353
ρ̂ -0.646 -0.487
[-0.885,-0.137] [-0.731,-0.135]
No. of instruments 0 0 3
First-stage F-statistic 31.994
Observations 3031 3031 3031
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Table 2.3
Variation in sanctioning costs
This table reports regression results where the dependent variable is mental health problems and the independent variable of interest
is the interaction between high welfarism and an indicator variable capturing whether the Conservative party is in government.
The reported values are probit coefficient estimates. Columns (1) to (3) show the results for individuals with high conformity with
societal norms that place value on strong labour market involvements, whereas Columns (4) to (6) show the results for low conformity
individuals. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The stars ***, ** and * denote levels of significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent,
respectively.
Mental health problem
High conformity individuals Low conformity individuals
Employed No benefits
Employed and
no benefits Not employed Has benefits
Not employed
and has benefits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High welfarism=0 × Tory government=1 0.454*** 0.376*** 0.392*** 0.493*** 0.415*** 0.442***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
High welfarism=1 × Tory government=0 (λ2) 0.398*** 0.424*** 0.462*** 0.379*** 0.348*** 0.353***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
High welfarism=1 × Tory government=1 (λ3) 0.692*** 0.873*** 0.892*** 0.599*** 0.651*** 0.601***
(0.13) (0.15) (0.17) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13)
University education 0.124* 0.077 0.098 0.157** 0.177* 0.263**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11)
Married or cohabitating -0.056 0.058 -0.042 -0.053 0.070 0.008
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Female 0.285*** 0.306*** 0.295*** 0.279*** 0.270*** 0.269***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Age 0.026 0.037** 0.029 0.070*** 0.101*** 0.119***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age2 -0.000* -0.000** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Single household 0.108 0.255** 0.167 0.066 0.199** 0.119
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
Constant -1.154*** -1.425*** -1.221*** -2.052*** -2.595*** -2.981***
(0.34) (0.35) (0.43) (0.36) (0.36) (0.49)
Prob > χ2 (H0 : λ2 = λ3) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 2242 1607 1270 2662 2027 1690
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Table 2.4
Gender, welfarism and mental health
This table reports the coefficient estimates from a probit regression of mental
health problems on the interaction of the female indicator and welfarism scores
variables. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The stars ***, ** and *
denote levels of significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
Mental health problem
Female=0 × Welfarism score 0.025***
(0.01)






















Gender and variations in sanctioning costs
This table reports the coefficient estimates from a probit regression of mental
health problems on the triple interaction of the female indicator, Tory govern-
ment indicator and welfarism score variables. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. The stars ***, ** and * denote levels of significance at 1, 5 and 10
percent, respectively.
Mental health problem
Female=0 × Tory government=0 × Welfarism score 0.026***
(0.01)
Female=0 × Tory government=1 × Welfarism score 0.037***
(0.01)
Female=1 × Tory government=0 × Welfarism score 0.033***
(0.01)




















This table reports the average marginal effects (AMEs) from an ordered probit regression of attitudes to voting on the triple
interaction of mental health problems, high welfarism and gender, as shown in Equation (2.9). The respective outcome to which the
AMEs refer is indicated in the column heading. Columns (1) to (3) show the results for the subgroup with reports of mental health
problems; Columns (4) to (6) show the results for that with no reports of mental health problems. 846 respondent observations from
the 2000 and 2013 British Social Attitudes surveys are used in the estimation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The
stars ***, ** and * denote levels of significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
Mental health problems
Yes No
Not worth voting Vote if care who wins Duty to vote Not worth voting Vote if care who wins Duty to vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High welfarism -0.088*** -0.049** 0.137*** -0.023 -0.014 0.037
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
University education -0.130*** -0.062*** 0.192*** -0.124*** -0.070*** 0.194***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
Married or cohabitating -0.054* -0.026* 0.080* -0.052* -0.029* 0.081*
(0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Female -0.034 -0.016 0.051 -0.033 -0.018 0.051
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Age -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.005*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.006***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Single household -0.051 -0.024 0.075 -0.048 -0.027 0.075
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
Observations 846 846 846 846 846 846
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Endogenous Peer Choice and
Investment Participation
Highlights
∗ A peer effects model for binary outcome variables is proposed that explicitly ac-
counts for endogenous relationship formations in household networks. Given the high
dimensionality of the parameter space, estimation takes place in a Bayesian econo-
metric framework using Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampling methods.
∗ The model is brought to the data for two outcome variables: a general investment
income indicator variable and an interest + dividend income indicator variable. It is
estimated both with exogenous and endogenous relationship formations. The model
comparison reveals that endogenous peer choice accounts for approximately 25% of
the peer effect in investment participation.
∗ To investigate the economic effect of low participation rates, a simulation exercise
restricts the peer effect to zero and produces counter-factual individual investment
participation. The exercise suggests that participation rates would be 7% to 10%




Societal differences in financial inclusion have significant implications for wealth
inequality (Favilukis, 2013), as well as labour market and economy-wide stability
(Epstein & Shapiro, 2020). As individuals with greater incomes and education are
more likely to marry one another (Nakosteen et al., 2004) and, at the same time,
are more optimistic about future macroeconomic conditions (Das et al., 2020), the
possibility exists that prudent financial behaviours, such as the use of investment
products, perpetuate differently in groups of societies with homogeneous intra-
group characteristics, with subsequent differential impacts on financial inclusion.
Prior research suggests that individuals influence each other in their decisions to
participate in retirement schemes or the stock market (Arrondel, Calvo Pardo,
Giannitsarou & Haliassos, 2020; Duflo & Saez, 2003; Haliassos, Jansson & Kar-
abulut, 2019; Kaustia & Knüpfer, 2012). This literature however does not answer
to what extent the tendency of individuals similar to each other to form relation-
ships affects individual investment propensities via the peer effects channel. In
this thesis chapter, we seek to fill this gap.
Specifically, this thesis chapter constitutes the first effort, to the best of our know-
ledge, to investigate whether such homophily in relationship formation affects in-
vestment participation while jointly testing for the presence of peer effects. To do
so, we extend the selection-corrected spatial autoregressive model by Hsieh and Lee
(2016), explicitly modelling latent variables driving both relationship formation
and outcomes, to account for the limited-nature of binary dependent variables.
In order to solve the reflection problem (Manski, 1993), the difficulty of separating
the peer effect from contextual effects, our model exploits the insights from the
introduction of the spatial auto-regressive (SAR) model to the study of social
networks (Lee, 2007; Lee, Liu & Lin, 2010; X. Lin, 2010). Specifically, non-
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linearities in the SAR model, generated by non-overlapping peer groups, identify
the peer effect (Hsieh & Lee, 2016).
In this study, household networks that arise from split-off households in the lon-
gitudinal data obtained from Understanding Society and the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS) constitute these peer groups. Split-off households arise from
existing households dissolving and their current members moving into new house-
holds. Members of these new households that are not part of the survey are invited
to join, and their joining makes household networks observable in the data1.
We focus on two measures of investment participation. First, respondents are
asked whether they have received any form of investment income, namely any
income from private pension/annuities, rent from boarders or lodgers, rent from
any other properties and income from savings and investments in the last 12
months. This variable is available from 2011 onward. Second, we focus on a
variable that captures whether respondents have received any income from interest
or dividends. This variable is available from the years 2001 onward.
In the empirical analysis, we first estimate our binary network model without
modelling the influence of latent variables, controlling for a host of demographic,
socio-economic and spatial information. The estimation results suggest a positive
and statistically significant peer effect with respect to both the general investment
income and the interest and dividends variable. Further, we observe that the
peers influence extends beyond that of their individual investment behaviour; peers
educational and income levels infer a strong relation to investment participation.
Unsurprisingly, individual age, personal income, retirement status and educational
levels also influence individual investment propensities.
We proceed to investigate the effect of latent variables driving both investment
1Our definition of household networks relates to, but is broader than, the definition of ex-




participation and relationship formation. The optimal models for both the general
investment as well as the interest and dividends variable suggest the existence of
two latent variables that drive both investment participation and link formation.
As a result, the peer effect for the investment income variable drops by 5% versus
the baseline estimate; while that for the interest and dividends income variable
drops by 25%. However, in both cases, the estimates remain strongly statistic-
ally significant. This corroborates the importance of homophily with respect to
investment participation through the peer effect channel.
To test the effect peer effects have on overall investment participation levels in
our data, we sample from the posterior predictive distributions of our selection-
corrected model estimated with respect to both of our outcome variables of in-
terest. Specifically, we first sample from the posterior distribution keeping the peer
effects at their estimated values; second, we constrain the peer effects to zero. We
find that peer effects depress overall investment participation in our data: we find
that participation would be 7%-10% higher if peer effects were absent. This sug-
gests the interpretation that individuals who are not participating in investments
appear to effectively deter other individuals from investing.
This thesis chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 lays out related literature.
In Section 3.3, we describe the identification of the peer effect using household
networks and the construction of our sample, as well descriptive statistics for our
data. In Section 3.4, we introduce our Bayesian random effects probit model with
self-selection of peer relationships. In Section 3.5, we report our estimation results;





This thesis chapter relates to the literature on peer effects in financial behaviours.
In their seminal contribution, Duflo and Saez (2003) show that informing a ran-
dom subset of employees in a large university of the benefits of enrolling in a
tax-deferred retirement plan increases not only the enrolment rates of those in
attendance but also of those that were absent. Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012) docu-
ment that individuals living in areas with better opportunities to learn from others
are more likely to participate in the stock market. Using individuals expectations
of their peers behaviours, Arrondel et al. (2020) find that both imitation of and in-
formation from peers are significant drivers of stock market participation. Making
use of an exogenous allocation of refugees to different neighbourhoods in Sweden,
Haliassos et al. (2019) show that exposure to financially literate increases parti-
cipation intensity in private retirement schemes and the stock market, but only
for educated refugee households and when interaction with their environment are
possible.
The work in this chapter further contributes to the literature that shows how
the self-selection of relationships can amplify peer effects due to unobserved char-
acteristics that influence both the formation of peer relationships and economic
outcomes. Weinberg (2007) appears to be the first to introduce a model of so-
cial interactions in which relationships between individuals form endogenously.
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) introduce a spatial autoregressive model
that jointly models the self-selection of peers, including a binary latent variable
that drives both the link formation between individuals and the continuous de-
pendent variable of interest. For the case of one unobserved dimension, Badev
(2013) extend this to binary choices in a Maximum Likelihood framework. Hsieh
and Lee (2016) extend the latent variables model to include one or more con-
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tinuous latent variables in a logit parametrisation of the self-selection equation;
while Johnsson and Moon (2019) study unobserved drivers in a semi-parametric
approach, leaving the form of the selection equation unspecified. Hsieh, Lee and
Boucher (2019) extend the model by Hsieh and Lee (2016) to include incentives in
selection, while Hsieh and Van Kippersluis (2018) allow for heterogeneity in peer
effects.
Moreover, emerging developments in this literature estimate the peer effect jointly
with unobservable social ties. In their seminal paper, de Paula, Rasul and Souza
(2020) propose a method that uncovers social ties in panel data with no meas-
urements on these relationships using the Adaptive Elastic Net GMM method.
As cited by de Paula et al. (2020, p. 5), applications are already underway: for
example, Fetzer, Souza, Eynde and Wright (2020) use this method to study the
displacement of insurgency groups in Afghanistan as international security forces
withdraw. Zhou (2019) contribute a model extension to account for link hetero-
geneity; while Z. Lin, Tang and Yu (2020) suggest the extension of link discovery
and estimation of the peer effect for binary outcomes.
3.3 Data and household networks
3.3.1 Identification and household networks
In this section, we describe how split-off households in household longitudinal
surveys can be employed to reveal household networks and how these, in turn, can
be used to solve the reflection problem (Manski, 1993), the difficulty of separating
the peer effect from contextual effects, which arises when studying investment
participation under peer influence. To do so, we exploit the designs of longitudinal
surveys.
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Household longitudinal surveys, tracking the same individuals of a given household
over time, suffer from attrition, i.e. respondents dropping out of the survey over
time. Attrition threatens the surveys’ representativeness, and in order to ensure
that the surveys remain representative of their target population, the occurrence
of split-off households is exploited: households that newly form when, for example,
grown-up children move out of their parents’ home and find shared flats, cohabit-
ating couples break up and move into new homes or flatmates move in with their
partners or other people. Members of these newly created households that were
not part of the respective survey are invited to join, and by adding respondents to
the survey in this way, the drop in respondent numbers is counteracted, ensuring
the surveys’ representativeness.
To illustrate, assume that every respondent is represented in a network by a node.
Two nodes are connected by an edge if and only if these two respondents have
lived together at some point in time. A collection of directly or indirectly connec-
ted nodes constitutes a household network. Household networks then grow when
existing households dissolve and split-off households form: new nodes and edges
appear when individuals begin living together and new household members join
the survey.
Figure 3.7 illustrates how these spit-off households form and, consequently, house-
hold networks surface. The left-hand panel indicates an existing household at time
t. Each node represents one of the household members a, b and c, and their nodes
are connected as they live in the same household. At time t + 1, shown in the
right-hand panel of Figure 3.7, their household has dissolved. Respondent a has
moved in with individuals d, e and f ; together they form the new household A.
Respondent b has moved in with individual g, while respondent c is now living
alone. Households A, B and C are split-off households, as they have split-off from
the household at time t, and the individuals d, e, f and g have newly joined the
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survey. Together these new households form a household network. Household
network continue to grow as time passes and more split-off households form.
Household networks vary in size, depending on the frequency of households in
the respective network splitting, thereby providing econometric identification for
peer effect parameters through the mechanism of non-overlapping peer groups
(starting with Blume, Brock, Durlauf & Jayaraman, 2015; Bramoullé, Djebbari &
Fortin, 2009; Lee, 2007). From an economic perspective, we argue that household
networks provide a natural reference group to capture peer effects with respect
to potentially many outcomes. Though friendships to individuals outside the
household network are not observed in the data, it appears intuitive that the
people respondents live with provide an important context for social learning,
imitation or exchange of information.
3.3.2 Data sources and sample construction
We use data from the UK’s Understanding Society and the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS) covering the years 2001 to 2016, fielded by the University of
Essex and funded by the Economic and Social Sciences Research Council (ESRC),
to conduct our analysis of investment participation under peer influence. Both
surveys are closely related to each other and can be combined for analysis: in
1991, fieldwork started for the BHPS and in its 18th year, respondents were asked
to join the larger Understanding Society survey, to which approximately 84% of
respondents agreed. Aside from the BHPS sample of respondents, Understanding
Society includes two further samples to ensure the its representativeness for the
immigrant and ethnic subpopulations. These surveys are representative of the
UK population and provide detailed insights into the respondents’ lives over time.
In particular, the data contain detailed information on the respondents financial
and demographic characteristics. The full list of variables and details of their
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construction is reported in Appendix 3.A, and descriptive statistics are provided
in the next section.
In order to construct our samples of interest, we separately require non-missing
observations on the two key explanatory variables of interest: binary indicators
capturing 1) whether the respondents receive any income from investments gen-
erally (private pension/annuities, rent from boarders or lodgers, rent from any
other properties and income from savings and investments) captured from the
year 2011 onwards and 2) whether the respondents receive any income from in-
terest or dividends, elicited from 2001 onwards. Moreover, we also require for
valid respondent observations to have non-missing information on a rich set of
demographic characteristics, capturing in detail the respondents’ age, education,
employment status, number of children and gender. We additionally include the
Government Office Region of where the respondents are domiciled in the UK and
the year in which they are surveyed.
Next, we identify household networks using information on with whom respond-
ents live in a given survey year, t. Specifically, both Understanding Society and
the BHPS supply the table egoalt in which household membership of each re-
spondent (the ego or “the self”; identified uniquely by the integer variable pidp) is
reported jointly with their members of household (the alter or “the other”; iden-
tified uniquely by the integer variable apidp). Each row contains one pidp-apidp
relationship, and as every respondent’s identifier in pidp in one row appears as the
identifier apidp in another, we remove redundant information by imposing that
pidp < apidp.
In the next step, we iterate through the combined information on pidp-apidp pairs
of the consecutive years t and t+1. In each step, we pool both year’s information
and remove redundant observations that arise when respondents live together at
both time t and t + 1. We then identify non-overlapping networks in the data
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by assigning directly or indirectly connected respondents into distinct groups. At
this stage, the set of returned groups will contain households that have and have
not split. In order to retain only those groups that result in household networks
arising from split-off households, we require of valid groups to satisfy the network
property that not all possible edges are present, i.e. some respondents never lived
with each other. Put differently, in valid networks the number of actual edges is
less than the number of possible ones; or, equivalently, the network density is less
than unity.
This procedure results in a total sample of 5079 observations for our analysis with
respect to the dividend and interest income variable, and 3200 observations for
the investment income variable.
3.3.3 Descriptive statistics
In Panel A of Table 3.1, we show the counts, percentages and cumulative percent-
ages of the relationship types of the respondents in the split-off households in our
samples with respect to the investment income variable. Those for the interest
+ dividends income variable are unavailable due to data limitations. The table
shows that a third (34.69%) of the relationship types in these households are that
of a natural parent and child, while the next biggest groups constitute partner/co-
habitee relationships (13.83%), two unrelated individuals living together (13.29%),
natural siblings (12.07%) and husband and wife (10.48%). The large variability in
relationship types is apparent in those types with less than 5% representation in
the sample: it includes wider family relationships types, relationships between in-
laws, foster relationships, in addition to relationship types that are missing in the
data. Relationships of individuals that have never lived together are unrecorded
and not reflected in the table.
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In Panel B of Table 3.1, we show the absolute, relative and cumulative frequencies
of household network sizes. With respect to the investment income variable, we
observe variability in network sizes: most household networks have 3, 4 or 5 mem-
bers, amounting to 86.15% of all networks. However, the distribution of household
networks sizes exhibits a long tail, with the remaining networks being constituted
of 6 to 15 members.
In Table 3.2, we report the newly-formed number of household networks, number
of respondents and the degree of investment participation by year. With respect
to the investment income variable in Panel (a), we observe data from year 2011
onward. The number of household networks in the years 2011 to 2016 lies between
76 and 175, with 329 to 820 network members. The average investment income
participation lies between 21% to 29%. As missing values for the investment
income variable are imputed, we observe a lot more respondents than for the
interest and dividend income variable in Panel (b); for this, we observe data from
the year 2001 to 2016, with the number of household networks identified in each
year varying between 51 and 130, amounting to 207 to 593 respondents. Average
interest and dividend income participation lies between 14% and 24%. Overall,
we observe that investment participation across both measures and all years in
our sample is low.
Table 3.3 indicates that the sample average investment participation as measured
by the investment income and interest and dividend income variable is 26% and
18%, respectively. Additionally, Table 3.3 includes summary statistics for the
individual- and household-level characteristics in our samples. The average age of
respondents in our samples is 34.07 and 32.93. This is lower than the UK average
of 39 according to the UK Census in 2011 (ONS, 2011). However, this is to be
expected given our measurement strategy of household networks: as seen above,
approximately a third (34.69%) of the observed relationships in our sample are
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those of a natural parent to one of its children. Children typically move out of
the family home at in their early twenties, at which point the household has split,
resulting in the parents being included in our sample at a younger age, depressing
the average sample age.
We observe a lot of heterogeneity in the respondents’ highest educational attain-
ments. The majority of respondents hold A-levels (28%/29%), a university degree
(25%/17%) or the GCSE (23%/25%). Some respondents have no educational
qualifications (6%/10%), while others hold some other qualification (8%/10%) or
some other higher qualification (10%/9%). At the same time, about two-thirds
(66%/65%) of respondents are in full- or part-time employment as an employee or
in self-employment. A small number of respondents in our sample look after their
family or home (5%/6%), are retired (4%/3%) or are sick or disabled (2%/4%).
The remaining respondents (23%/23%) indicated that they have another occu-
pation. The average monthly gross labour income is equal to £1,154.01 and
£1,002.99 in the different samples, respectively. On average, every fourth re-
spondent in the sample is responsible for a child (0.23/0.29 number of children,
on average). Further, the sample is made up of approximately equal numbers
of females (51%/52%) and males (49%/48%), and it captures substantial spa-
tial heterogeneity across the twelve Government Office Regions, varying from 3%
(Northern Ireland) to 12% (South East).
3.4 Methodology
In this section, we describe our binary random effects multivariate probit model,
its estimation with Bayesian Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampling algorithms and
its extension to account for endogeneity in the adjacency matrix of peers borrowing
from the insights by Hsieh and Lee (2016) on how to model latent variables driving
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both link formation and outcomes.
3.4.1 Motivation
3.4.1.1 A simple example
The methodology proposed in this thesis chapter constitutes an extension of that
by Hsieh and Lee (2016). The existing approach quantifies the peer effect in models
with endogenous networks non-overlapping peer groups for continuous outcome
variables. This chapter proposes the implementation for binary outcome variables.
To see the importance of such an approach, consider the following example.
Let there be three individuals that influence each other in their investment propensity




















where εi, for i = 1, 2, 3, are standard normal error terms. The latent propensities,
y∗i , are linked to the observable binary outcomes, yi, in the conventional way
through the indicator function 1(·): yi = 1(y∗i > 0), where 1(·) takes the value one
if its argument is true, and zero otherwise. yi = 1 indicates that the individual i
invests, while yi = 0 means that she does not. The elements wi,j of the adjacency
matrix take the value one if individual i has lived with individual j, and zero
otherwise. For the case in which i = j, it also takes the value zero.
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From Equation (3.2) it is more easily seen that if there is a common driver that
determines both wij and εi, where i ̸= j, there will be bias in λ due to this
omitted factor, which manifests in violation of the respective moment condition;




j )εi] ̸= 0.
To express this notion in more detail, assume that from the perspective of in-
dividual i, whether to live with j is determined by an unobserved factor zi, so
that wij = F (zi). And this factor also influences the propensity of i to invest, so
that εi = G(zi) + ηi where ηi is white noise. Then E[wijεi] = E[F (zi)G(zi)] ̸= 0,
rendering wij endogenous and thereby introducing bias in an estimate of λ unless
this endogeneity is explicitly accounted for.
This point can also be seen more generally. Consider Equation (3.1) expressed with
appropriately defined matrices: y∗ = λW (z)y∗+ ε, where the vector z collects the
unobservable factors for the individuals. Simple rearranging yields y∗ = (I −
λW (z))−1ε, where I is the identity matrix and assuming the matrix I − λW (z) is
invertible. Given the above relationships, we can see that E[(I −λW (z))−1ε] ̸= 0.
3.4.1.2 Potential sources of endogeneity
What factors might these latent variables in the vector z capture? In order to be
relevant in terms of endogeneity, they need to be (i) related to the likelihood that
i has shared a household with j and (ii) to i’s propensity to hold investments.
In the context of the household networks introduced in Section 3.3.1, two types
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of factors are of significant import, reflecting the aforementioned distribution of
relationship types visible in Table 3.2. These capture relationships between re-
lated individuals (for instance, mother/daughter) and those that are otherwise
connected (for example, flatmates).
First, consider a relationship such as that between mother and daughter. At first
glance, no endogeneity may seem to arise from these types of relationships; after
all, mother and daughter share the same household almost by default. However,
this shorthand view belies the role that genetics play in this relationship. More
precisely, it is genetic similarity that determines their sharing of the same house-
hold. Conventionally, this is treated as unobservable. Accordingly, assume that
the latent zi captures the mother’s genetic makeup and zj that of her daughter.
The genetic distance between the two can then be conceptualised as the difference
zi−zj = zi−0.5zi = 0.5zi. This genetic difference then plays an important role in
whether a household is shared; phrased in the notation of the preceding section:
wij = F (zi) = 0.5zi. Further, genetics have been shown to exert significant in-
fluence over individual financial behaviours and outcomes (Barth, Papageorge &
Thom, 2020; Cesarini, Johannesson, Lichtenstein, Sandewall & Wallace, 2010) and
investment decisions (Barnea, Cronqvist & Siegel, 2010; Cronqvist & Siegel, 2014).
In this context, genetics therefore constitute a potential source of endogeneity.
Second, in the case of relationships between individuals that are not related, demo-
graphic factors can play an important role in both household formation decisions
as well as in investment participation. Research shows that individuals form rela-
tionships, and consequently households, on the basis of similarity in demographic
and economic characteristics; for example, high-earning and highly educated indi-
viduals are more likely to marry one another (Nakosteen et al., 2004). At the same
time, more specialist human capital such as financial literacy is known to signific-
antly influence financial behaviours such as stock market participation (Van Rooij
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et al., 2011). While years of schooling and type of educational attainment are typ-
ically captured in surveys, more granular educational dimensions, such as financial
literacy, are not. Therefore, in the context of this chapter, these characteristics
are considered latent and therefore have the potential to generate a confounded
measurement of the peer effect.
3.4.2 Data structures
We assume our data is made up of N individual-level observations that can be
characterized by the N×1 vector of binary outcomes y, the N×(1+K+L) matrix
of socio-economic and demographic individual- or household-level characteristics
X, including the constant term, (where K and L are the number of continuous
and dummy variables, respectively) and the N ×D matrix Z. The data can then






We assume that y and X are observable. In contrast, Z is assumed to contain
unobservable individual characteristics of interest, possibly as a result of missing
data or inherent measurement problems.
Further, we assume that each of the N observations in the matrix in (3.3) can be
mapped to one and only one of G non-overlapping household networks. We assume
that each network has mg members, so that the total number of observations is
equal to the sum of the G network sizes, N =
∑G
g=1mg.
Given these assumptions on the network structures, we can make partition the
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for i = 1, . . . ,mg individuals
and g = 1, . . . , G networks (3.4)
where yg, Xg and Zg are the outcomes, observable and unobservable character-
istics, respectively, for the network g. The scalar yi,g denotes the outcome for
individual i in network g, while x′i,g and z′i,g are row vectors of size 1× (1+K+L)
and 1×D of the observable and unobservable individual-level characteristics, re-
spectively.
Each household network is associated with a mg × mg matrix capturing which
individuals live together and which do not. This adjacency matrix is denoted Wg
for g = 1, . . . , G. Its elements, wij,g, take values of one if the individuals i and j
have lived together at any point in time, and zero otherwise, for i = 1, . . . ,mg and
i = j, . . . ,mg. For the purpose of this study, we assume that an individual does not
live with itself, so that the wij,g = 0 if i = j, resulting in a diagonal of zeros. Two
individuals living together intuitively implies an undirected relationship between
i and j, resulting in symmetry of Wg: wij = wji for all i and j:
Wg = (wij,g) =

0 w12,g · · · w1mg ,g
w21,g 0 · · · w2mg ,g
... ... . . . ...
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Given these assumptions, we are able to reconstruct any of these adjacency matrices
from only their upper or lower triangular entries (excluding the diagonal entries),
which facilitates efficient memory usage in computations. Importantly, we do not
row-normalize Wg.
3.4.3 The likelihood function
Our outcome variable of interest, yi,g for individual i in network g, is an indicator
variable that takes the value one if the individual receives a positive amount of
investment income and zero otherwise. We ask whether the propensity of indi-
vidual i to receive investment income is influenced by the respective propensities
of those individuals in individual i’s network g. For this purpose, we specify a
linear-in-means peer effect model with group-level random effects (following Lee,
Li and Lin (2014) in its specification of the random effects),
y∗g = λWgy
∗
g +Xgβ1 +WgXgβ2 + σααglg + εg
where yi,g =

1 if y∗i,g > 0
0 if y∗i,g ≤ 0
(3.6)
where y∗ is the vector of latent investment participation propensities, related to
observed outcomes in the standard fashion. λ is the peer effect parameter of
interest, while β1 and β2 are the coefficients of the respondents own covariates,
Xg, and those of the respondents’ peers group, WgXg, respectively. lg is a vector
of ones with length mg. The terms σααglg, for g = 1, . . . , G, capture the group
random effects, where αg ∼ N (0, 1) and σα > 0, so that the products σααg are
i.i.d. N (0, σα). The vector of errors follows a multivariate distribution with the
identity matrix as its covariance matrix, εg ∼ N (0, Img), reflecting the standard
probit assumption of normalizing the standard deviation of the latent propensities
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to unity.
In order to capture the effects of unobserved variables on both the propensity to
participate in financial investments and the likelihood of individuals living together
when having similar latent characteristics, thus potentially amplifying the peer
effect λ, we further adopt the formulation by Hsieh and Lee (2016) and assume
that the error term εi,g of individual i is jointly distributed with the vector of
vector of unobserved variables, z′i,g = (zi1,g · · · ziD,g). Together they follow a
multivariate distribution with a mean vector of zeros and covariance matrix Σ,
(εi,g, zi1,g, . . . , ziD,g)




The covariance matrix of the vector zi,g is denoted by ΣZ , while the vector ρzε cap-
tures the correlation of the latent variables in zi,g with the error term εi,g, thereby
constituting the channel through which the individual unobserved characteristics
can affect the investment participation propensities. Z, ρzε and ΣZ cannot be
identified so ΣZ is normalized to equal the identity matrix of same size, ID, and
the correlation coefficients in pεz = (p1,εz · · · pD,εz) are normalized to be positive
Hsieh and Lee (2016).
To capture the effects of the latent variables in Zg on the likelihood that two
individuals live together, we focus on the undirected relationships between indi-
viduals i and j where i < j. This is equivalent to modelling the upper triangular
potion (excluding the diagonal entries) of the adjacency matrix Wg, which fully
characterizes the whole matrix due to the symmetry and diagonal of zeros of Wg,
as discussed above . Specifically, we assume that the probability that i and j
live together is a function of the absolute differences of continuous observables,
indicators of shared binary characteristic and the absolute differences between
their unobservable characteristics (Fafchamps & Gubert, 2007a, 2007b). We fur-
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ther assume that this probability can be approximated by the standard logistic
function:
P (wij,g = 1 | c, γ, θ, δ, x′i,g, z′i,g) =
exp (ψij,g)
1 + exp(ψij,g)










δd|zid,g − zjd,g| (3.8)
where K̄ denotes the number of absolute differences of the continuous observable
variables between i and j, L̄ the number of indicators of shared binary charac-
teristics and D the number of absolute differences in latent variables. 1(·) again
denotes the indicator function that takes the value one if its argument is true, and
zero otherwise. The regression constant is denoted by c. In order to identify the
vector δ′ = (δ1 · · · δD), we assume that its elements are sorted in ascending order,
δ1 ≤ . . . ≤ δD.
Equations (3.6) to (3.8) together specify how the latent variables in Zg affect both
the propensity to participate in financial investments and the likelihood of living
with individuals who have similar latent characteristics, thus introducing potential
amplification of the peer effect λ. How such latent variables can act as confounders
in the estimation of peer effects is easily seen from the conditional distribution of
the latent propensities yg given the unobserved covariates Zg for g = 1, . . . , G,
y∗g = λWgy
∗
g +Xgβ1 +WgXgβ2 + ZgΣ
−1
Z ρzε + σααglg + νg (3.9)
The error term distribution equals νg ∼ N (0, σ2νImg) with σ2ν = 1 − ρzϵΣ−1Z ρϵz.
This conditional distribution in Equation (3.9) can be derived from Equation (3.7)
given the standard properties of the multivariate normal distribution. The term
ZgΣ
−1
Z ρzε captures the effect of the unobserved variables on y∗g , which would be
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erroneously attributed to λ if it were omitted.
In order to derive the joint distribution function of the latent propensities, the
conditional distribution of y∗g in Equation (3.9) can be manipulated by subtracting
λWgy
∗
g from both sides, factoring out y∗g on the left-hand side and pre-multiplying
both sides by the Leontief-inverse (Img − λWg)−1. This yields:
y∗g = B
−1
λ,gµg + ug (3.10)
Bλ,g = Img − λWg (3.11)
µg = Xgβ1 +WgXgβ2 + ZgΣ
−1









]−1). Equations (3.10) to (3.13) constitute the main
model equations. Together they imply that the vectors y∗g , for g = 1, . . . , G, are
distributed with heteroskedasticity, following a multivariate normal distribution




The product B−1λ,gµg can be obtained efficiently by system-of-equations solver,
without requiring to compute the inverse B−1λ,g explicitly; a process which would
be both comparably slow and numerically unstable (Stan Development Team,
2018). Additionally, in order to avoid computation of the matrix inverse in the
covariance matrix, we employ the parametrisation of the multivariate normal dis-
tribution in terms of the precision matrix, defined as the inverse of the covariance
matrix. Therefore, the latent propensities for the networks g, for g = 1, . . . , G,
can be expressed as a multivariate normal distribution with mean vector B−1λ,gµg
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and precision matrix (1/σ2ν)B′λ,gBλ,g,









1 if y∗i,g > 0
0 if y∗i,g ≤ 0
(3.15)
Chib and Greenberg (1998) show that a multivariate distributions such that as
described by Equation (3.14), for g = 1, . . . , G, can be thought of as truncated at
zero as a result of the bounds implied by Equation (3.15). In the below, we further
draw on the insights by Chib and Greenberg (1998) to draw from the resulting
truncated multivariate normal distribution.
Consequently, the probability of observing the vector of ones and zeros yg, for
g = 1, . . . , G, is given by integrating over the density function of latent variables,






P (y∗g | Zg,Ω) dy∗g (3.16)
where Ω = {λ, β1, β2, σα, {αg}, ρεz} denotes the set of parameter of the peer effects
equation and P (·) denotes probability mass or density functions. The bound
of integration equals Ai,g = (−∞, 0] if yi,g = 0 and Ai,g = [0,∞) if yi,g = 1
for i = 1, . . . ,mg. We exclude the remaining exogenous variables for notational
convenience. The likelihood function for y = (y′1 · · · y′g)′ is then given by
P (y | {Zg},Ω) =
G∏
g=1
P (yg | {Zg},Ω) (3.17)
The expression of the posterior density of the parameter values then follows from
Bayes’ theorem:
P ({Zg},Ω | y) ∝ P ({Zg},Ω) · P (y | {Zg},Ω) (3.18)
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However, in our estimation, we will focus on the joint posterior distribution of
the parameters and the latent {y∗g}, which follows from Bayes’ theorem and the
relationship P (Y,X) = P (Y | X)P (X) for two random variables Y and X,
P ({y∗g}, {Zg},Ω | y) ∝ P ({Zg},Ω) · f({y∗g} | {Zg},Ω)
· P (y | {y∗g}, {Zg},Ω) (3.19)
Noting that the conditional probability of observing the vector yg depends on
whether the latent variables y∗g fall in the set Ag = A1,g × · · · × Amg ,g, where ×
denotes the Cartesian product, it holds that P (y | {y∗g}, {Zg},Ω) = 1({y∗g ∈ Ag}),
where 1 denotes the indicator function as introduced above, which simplifies the
posterior density to:
P ({y∗g}, {Zg},Ω | y) ∝ P ({Zg},Ω) · f({y∗g} | {Zg},Ω) · I({y∗g ∈ Ag}) (3.20)
By analogous reasoning, the posterior density, including the relevant terms for the
selection equation, is
P ({y∗g}, {Zg},Ω,Ψ | y) ∝ P ({Zg},Ω,Ψ) · P ({y∗g} | {Zg},Ω)
· I({y∗g ∈ Ag}) · P ({Wg} | {Zg},Ψ) (3.21)
where Ψ = {c, γ, θ, δ} denotes the set of parameters of the selection equation in
(3.8). Next, we turn to specifying the functional forms of the (mutually independ-
ent) prior distributions, P ({Zg},Ω,Ψ).
3.4.4 Prior densities
In order to ensure that the matrix Bλ,g is invertible for all values of λ, we follow
the standard approach of restricting λ to lie strictly between −1/τG to 1/τG where
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τG is equal to the number of edges of the best-connected node across all of the G
networks (Hsieh & Lee, 2016; Hsieh & Van Kippersluis, 2018; Kelejian & Prucha,
2010). On this interval, we specify a uniform prior distribution over the admissible
values of λ, λ ∼ U(−1/τG, 1/τG).
In Equation (3.6) and (3.8), we scale continuous regressors to have zero mean and a
standard deviation of 0.5 and the binary regressors to have mean zero, as suggested
by Gelman, Jakulin, Pittau, Su et al. (2008), and therefore follow Ghosh, Li, Mitra
et al. (2018) in placing weakly informative Student-t priors on the elements in the
coefficient vectors γ, θ, β1 and β2. Specifically, these priors are βk,1 ∼ t6(0, 2.5)
and βl,2 ∼ t6(0, 2.5) for k = 1, . . . , K and l = 1, . . . , L; γk̄,1 ∼ t6(0, 2.5) and
θl̄,1 ∼ t6(0, 2.5) k̄ = 1, . . . , K̄ and l̄ = 1, . . . , L̄, For the constant in the logistic
regression, we choose c ∼ t6(0, 10).
The standard deviation of the group-level random effects follows a weakly inform-
ative, Half-t prior distribution, restricting admissible values of σα to be positive,
σα ∼ Half -t6(0, 10), while αg, for g = 1, . . . , G have i.i.d. standard normal priors,
αg ∼ N (0, 1).
In accordance with the normalization assumption ΣZ = ID, we place informative
i.i.d. standard normal priors on the elements of matrix of latent variables Z, zi,d ∼
N (0, 1) for i = 1, . . . , N and d = 1, . . . , D. Additionally, we place informative beta
priors on the D correlation coefficients, which are normalized to lie in the interval
[0, 1], ρd,zϵ ∼ β(1, 10), and i.i.d. standard normal priors on δd, δd ∼ N (0, 1), for





We use RStan (Stan Development Team, 2018) to draw from the posterior dis-
tribution with Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC). HMC is a Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) method that uses the analytical gradients of the density distri-
butions to sample efficiently from the target posterior distribution (Betancourt,
2017; Betancourt & Girolami, 2015). The implementation details are complex and
involve advanced differential geometry; however, from a user-perspective, estim-
ating the parameters of the distribution amounts to writing a Stan program that
specifies the prior distributions and likelihood functions that make up the posterior
distribution. Stan then generates the draws from the posterior distribution.
3.5 Estimation results
In this section, we report the estimation results for both our binary spatial autore-
gressive (B-SAR, D = 0) model, assuming the adjacency matrix is exogenously
given, and the binary selection-corrected spatial autoregressive model (B-SCSAR,
D > 0), jointly modelling the peer relationships, using the methodology described
in the previous section. For each estimation, we specify four Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) chains to run in parallel, using a different set of diffuse initial
values for each. Each chain is set to run for 10000 iterations, where the first 4000
are used to arrive at the high density region of the stationary distribution. In
order to determine the number of relevant latent variables, we estimate various
B-SCSAR models, increasing the number of latent variables from D = 1 to D = 4,
and check for convergence of all model parameters using the R̂ convergence stat-
istic by Gelman and Rubin (1992): a statistic indicative of whether all MCMC
chains identify the same target distribution. In addition to the estimation res-
ults, we include plots of the MCMC chains and their respective correlograms for
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the peer effect parameter, λ. Moreover, we report results of the constrained and
unconstrained posterior predictive distributions for the B-SAR model.
3.5.1 General investment income
In this subsection, the dependent variable takes the value one if the respondent
has received any income from a private pension/annuities, rent from boarders or
lodgers, rent from any other properties and income from savings and investments,
and zero otherwise. To control for heterogeneity in the respondents, we include
the respondents’ own age, number of children, gross monthly income, occupational
status (employed, retired, sick or disabled, other job status), education (degree,
GCSE, A-level, higher degree, other education) and gender. For each respondent,
we capture the peer group characteristics along these same variables. Moreover, we
include year effects, region effects and group-level random effects. In the selection
equation, the covariates include the difference of the respondents’ ages, no of
children and personal incomes, as well as binary variables that indicate whether the
respondents share the same occupational status, education or gender. Moreover,
we include year effects to account for possibly changes in relationship formation
propensities over time. In both the outcome and selection equation, all continuous
covariates are scaled to have mean zero and standard deviation of 0.5, while all
binary covariates are centred at mean zero. The Appendix reports all variable
definitions.
Figure 3.2 shows the sets of consecutive draws of the peer effects parameter, λ,
from the posterior distribution. Panel (a) shows the MCMC draws for the B-SAR
model, in which no latent variables are specified (D = 0), while Panel (b) shows
the MCMC draws for the B-SCSAR model with two latent variables (D = 2).
In both graphs we observe that all four MCMC chains appear to be mixing well.
Figure 3.3 shows the corresponding correlograms for each of the four MCMC
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chains. Panel (a), again, shows the figures for the chains of the B-SAR model,
while Panel (b) displays those of the B-SCSAR model. In all correlograms, the
autocorrelations appear to die out quickly. In Panel (b), the fourth chain is the
only one that exhibits some noteworthy autocorrelation beyond lag 15, indicating
minor difficulty of the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampler to sample the posterior
distribution given the initial values of this respective chain.
Table 3.4 reports the estimation results for the B-SAR (D = 0) and B-SCSAR(D =
2) models. Panel A shows the results for the outcome equation. The point es-
timates correspond to the posterior means of the marginal distributions. For the
BSAR model, the peer effects equals 0.058 and is strongly significant at the 1%
level. This result indicates that, assuming that cohabiting relationships in the
household networks are exogenously given, the behaviour of respondents’ peers
constitute a strong influence for their own investment participation. Among the
demographic attributes, we observe that the respondents’ age, personal income
and educational levels (degree, A-level and higher degree) infer a strong positive
relation to the respondents’ investment participation propensities, significant at
the 1% level. The number of children of the respondent are strongly negatively
associated to investment, also significant at the 1% level. With respect to the
characteristics of the respondents’ peers, education (degree, A-level, higher de-
gree) is positively associated to the respondents’ individual investment propensity
(at the 5%, 5% and 10% level, respectively).
With respect to the B-SCSAR model, we observe a peer effect of 0.055, highly
significant at the 1% level. This estimate indicates that even after accounting
for latent characteristics that drive both relationship formation and individual
propensities, peers exert a significant influence on individual propensities; how-
ever, contrasting this result with the estimate obtained from the B-SAR model,
we note that the peer effect drops by approximately 5%. It thus appears that
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if peers select each other based on unobserved characteristics that also drive in-
vestment participation propensities, the observable peer effect is amplified. The
remaining estimates for the covariates (own and peers) in the B-SCSAR model
are numerically similar in magnitude and significance to the ones in the B-SAR
model.
Panel B of Table 3.4 reports the estimates for the selection equation of the B-
SCSAR model. The propensity for individuals to live together is lower, the greater
their age difference. Differences in number of children and personal income also
decrease the likelihood of two individuals living together. All these estimates
are significant at the 1% level. In contrast, individuals are more likely to have
a cohabiting relationship if they share the same level educational attainment,
significant at the 5% level. With respect to differences in the latent, the first and
largest effect of these differences is significant at the 1% level, while the difference
relating to the second latent variable is insignificant. Overall, the estimates of
the selection equation confirm the existence of significant drivers of relationship
formation, both observable and unobservable.
3.5.2 Interest and dividend income
In this subsection, the dependent variable takes the value one if the respondent
has received any interest or dividend income during the last 12 months, and zero
otherwise. As in the previous section, to control for respondent-level heterogeneity,
we include the respondents’ own age, number of children, gross monthly income,
occupational status (employed, retired, sick or disabled, other job status), edu-
cation (degree, GCSE, A-level, higher degree, other education) and gender. And
again, for each respondent, we capture the characteristics of the relevant peer
group along these same variables. We also include year effects, region effects and
group-level random effects. In the selection equation, the covariates include the
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difference of the respondents’ ages, no of children and personal incomes, as well
as binary variables that indicate whether the respondents share the same occu-
pational status, education or gender. We also include year effects to account for
possible changes in relationship formation propensities over time. In both the
outcome and selection equation, all continuous covariates are scaled to have mean
zero and standard deviation of 0.5, while all binary covariates are centred at mean
zero.
Figure 3.4 shows the sets of consecutive draws of the peer effects parameter, λ,
from the posterior distribution. Panel (a) shows the MCMC draws for the B-SAR
model, in which no latent variables are specified (D = 0), while Panel (b) shows
the MCMC draws for the B-SCSAR model with two latent variables (D = 2).
In both graphs we observe that all four MCMC chains appear to be mixing well.
Figure 3.5 shows the corresponding correlograms for each of the four MCMC
chains. Panel (a), again, shows the figures for the chains of the B-SAR model,
while Panel (b) displays those of the B-SCSAR model. In the correlograms for the
B-SAR models, we observe that the autocorrelations appear to die out quickly. In
Panel b), exhibit some noteworthy autocorrelation, indicating more difficulties of
the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampler to sample the posterior distribution given
the initial values of this respective chain.
Table 3.5 reports the estimation results for the B-SAR (D = 0) and B-SCSAR
(D = 2) models. Panel A shows the results for the outcome equation. The point
estimates correspond to the posterior means of the marginal distributions. For
the B-SAR model, the peer effects equals 0.085 and is significant at the 1% level.
Among the demographic attributes, we observe that the respondents’ age, personal
income and educational levels (degree, GCSE, A-level and higher degree) infer a
strong positive relation to the respondents’ investment participation propensities,
while the number of children relates negatively; all estimates being significant at
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the 1% level. Being male is also associated with higher investment propensities,
albeit at the 5% level. With respect to the characteristics of the respondents’
peers, the only significant predictor of the respondents’ investment participation
propensities is the peers’ number of children: they infer a negative relationship
to the respondents’ investment propensities, significant at the 5% level. The re-
maining estimates for the covariates (own and peers) in the B-SCSAR model are
numerically similar in magnitude and significance to the ones in the B-SAR model.
With respect to the B-SCSAR model, we observe a peer effect of 0.066, signific-
ant at the 5% level. The comparison in estimates of the peer effects between the
B-SAR and B-SCSAR models indicate that latent characteristics that drive both
relationship formation and individual propensities significantly amplify the peer
effect in investment participation in interest- or dividend-yielding products. The
peer effect drops by approximately 23% in magnitude, once endogenous relation-
ship formations are accounted for.
Panel B of Table 3.5 reports the estimates for the selection equation of the B-
SCSAR model. The propensity for individuals to live together is lower, the greater
their age difference. Differences in number of children and personal income also
decrease the likelihood of two individuals living together. All these estimates
are significant at the 1% level. In contrast, individuals are more likely to form
a cohabiting relationship if they share the same level educational attainment or
occupational status, both significant at the 1% level. With respect to differences in
the latent, the both of these are significant at the 1% level. Overall, the estimates
of the selection equation confirm the existence of significant drivers of relationship
formation, both observable and unobservable.
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3.6 Peer effects and overall investment
participation
In this section, we ask the question: what changes to the overall investment par-
ticipation could we expect in the absence of peer effects? To do so, we inspect
the posterior predictive distributions (PPD) of the B-SCSAR models of the pre-
vious two sections, with and without peer effects. Specifically, this amounts to
simulating the individual investment participation from the fitted model without
parameter restrictions and comparing it to simulations where the peer effect para-
meter is restricted to zero, λ = 0.
The relevant PPD takes the following form,
P
(
{ỹ∗g} | {Zg},Ω, {Xg}, {Wg}
)
(3.22)
where ỹ∗g denotes simulated values for the latent propensities for g = 1, . . . , G.
P (·) again denotes the probability density function. The parameters for the peer
effect and selection equation are collected in the sets Ω = {λ, β1, β2, σα, {αg}, ρεz }.
The elements of the vector of simulated individual investment participation, ỹg,
take the value one if the corresponding simulated latent propensities are greater
than zero, and zero otherwise.
For the general investment variable, the B-SCSAR model without restricting the
peer effects parameter generates a simulated investment participation of 33.62%,
while restricting the peer effect parameter to equal zero (λ = 0), yields a simu-
lated participation level of 35.09%. The estimated probability that the investment
participation simulated from the unrestricted model is greater than that of the re-
stricted model equals 0.9018, and, therefore, is significant at the 10% level.
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In the case of investment participation in interest or dividend yielding products,
the unrestricted B-SCSAR model generates a simulated investment participation
of 24.00%, while restricting the peer effect parameter to equal zero (λ = 0), yields
a simulated participation level of 26.53%. The estimated probability that the
investment participation simulated from the unrestricted model is greater than
that of the restricted model equals 0.9985, and, therefore, is significant at the 1%
level. Overall, the PPDs from the B-SCSAR models suggest that peers exert a
negative influence on levels of investment participation in the UK.
3.7 Conclusion
This thesis chapter provides evidence that unobservable characteristics signific-
antly influence peer choice jointly with the decision whether to participate in
holding investments, using UK data from Understanding Society and the Brit-
ish Household Panel Survey for the years 2001 to 2016. In order to identify the
peer effect in our empirical analysis, we use non-overlapping household networks
generated through split-off households. Employing Bayesian binary choice models
that uncover the peer effect and account for endogenous relationship formation,
two important results transpire. First, the endogenous choice of peers accounts
for approximately 25% of the peer effect in investment participation. This implies
that approximately a quarter of the investment participation rate attributed to
the effects of social learning or behavioural imitation are in fact a result of with
whom individuals decide to associate. Second, a simulation exercise in which the
peer effect, net of the effect of endogenous peer choice, is restricted to zero gener-
ates rates of counter-factual investment participation 7% to %10 higher than that
when no restrictions are imposed.
Together, these findings have important implications for policy makers. As the
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evidence suggests that factors exist that make it more likely for individuals in
social proximity to be self-similar as well as influence their propensities to invest,
policy makers ought to implement measures that prevent imprudent financial be-
haviours to self-perpetuate in distinct groups in society. Ensuring that individuals
from different socio-economic backgrounds have chances for interaction can be one
approach policy makers can take. Such an approach is necessarily structural; it can
be made operational, for instance, by ensuring that social housing is not relegated
to remote geographic areas that make it difficult for its residences to interact with
different socio-economic strata of society, thereby decreasing chances to strike up
relationships with individuals different to themselves and missing out on observing
examples of prudent financial behaviours. Further, policy makers can ensure that
affordable office space is available in urban areas – for public and third sector
organisations, for example – in which lucrative private sector businesses reside, so
that social interactions and informal knowledge exchange between individuals of
these sectors can be facilitated.
135
Figure 3.1
Household network growth process
This figure visualizes how “household networks” arise from “split-off households”.
Nodes indicate respondents and connected edges indicate that two respondents
have lived together at some point in time, or currently do so. The left-hand panel
shows an existing household at time t. Each node represents one of the household
members a, b and c. The right-hand panel shows the new household configuration
at time t + 1. Respondent a has moved in with individuals d, e and f ; together
they form the new household A. Respondent b has moved in with individual g,
while respondent c is now living alone. Their new households are denoted B and
C. Households A, B and C are called split-off households, as they have split-off
from the household at time t. The individuals d, e, f and g have newly joined
the survey. Together, these new households form a household network, which

















Traceplots for investment income models
This figure shows the traceplots of the peer effect (λ) for models in which the
investment income indicator is the dependent variable. Panel (a) shows the tra-
ceplots for the model with no latent variables (D = 0), while Panel (b) shows
those for the model with two latent variables (D = 2). The draws for four MCMC
chains are overlaid, were each run is comprised of 10000 draws, where the first 4000
warmup draws of the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampler are discarded. Variable
definitions are provided in Appendix A.
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(b) Two latent variables (D = 2)
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Figure 3.3
Correlograms for investment income models
This figure shows the correlograms of the peer effect (λ) for models in which
the investment income indicator is the dependent variable. ρλ(L) denotes the
autocorrelation for λ relative to lag L. Panel (a) shows the correlograms for the
model with no latent variables (D = 0), while Panel (b) shows those for the model
with two latent variables (D = 2). The correlograms for four MCMC chains are
overlaid, were each run is comprised of 10000 draws, where the first 4000 warmup
draws of the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampler are discarded. Variable definitions














































(b) Two latent variables (D = 2)
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Figure 3.4
Traceplots for investment + dividend income models
This figure shows the traceplots of the peer effect (λ) for models in which the
interest + dividend income indicator is the dependent variable. Panel (a) shows
the traceplots for the model with no latent variables (D = 0), while Panel (b)
shows those for the model with two latent variables (D = 2). The draws for four
MCMC chains are overlaid, were each run is comprised of 10000 draws, where the
first 4000 warmup draws of the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampler are discarded.
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.5
Correlograms for interest + dividend income models
This figure shows the correlograms of the peer effect (λ) for models in which the
interest + dividend income indicator is the dependent variable. ρλ(L) denotes the
autocorrelation for λ relative to lag L. Panel (a) shows the correlograms for the
model with no latent variables (D = 0), while Panel (b) shows those for the model
with two latent variables (D = 2). The correlograms for four MCMC chains are
overlaid, were each run is comprised of 10000 draws, where the first 4000 warmup
draws of the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampler are discarded. Variable definitions














































(b) Two latent variables (D = 2)
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Table 3.1
Relationship type and network size summary statistics
This table reports sample summary statistics (counts, percentages and cumulative
percentages) for observable relationship types across household networks (Panel
A) and for network sizes (Panel B), respectively. The values are based on the
investment income indicator due to data limitations.
Count Pct. Cum. Pct.
Panel A: Relationship types
Natural parent/child 1417 34.69 34.69
Partner/cohabitee 565 13.83 48.52
Non-relative 543 13.29 61.81
Natural brother/sister 493 12.07 73.88
Husband/wife 428 10.48 84.36
Missing 199 4.87 89.23
Step-parent/step-child 145 3.55 92.78
Landlord/landlady/tenant 60 1.47 94.25
Parent-in-law/son-in-law/sister-in-law 52 1.27 95.52
Brother-in-law/sister-in-law 49 1.20 96.72
Grandmother/grandfather and grandchild 41 1.00 97.72
Aunt/uncle and niece/nephew 24 0.59 98.31
Adoptive parent/child 19 0.47 98.78
Half-brother/half-sister 18 0.44 99.22
Cousin 16 0.39 99.61
Foster parent/child 6 0.15 99.76
Foster brother/sister 5 0.12 99.88
Other relative 5 0.12 100.00
Panel B: Network sizes
3 174 23.87 23.87
4 270 37.04 60.91
5 184 25.24 86.15
6 56 7.68 93.83
7 19 2.61 96.43
8 16 2.19 98.63
9 6 0.82 99.45
10 1 0.14 99.59
11 2 0.27 99.86
15 1 0.14 100.00
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Table 3.2
Network formation summary statistics across years
This table shows the number of newly formed household networks, the number of
respondents therein and the levels of financial participation across these networks
by year. The available data for the investment income variable covers the years
2011 to 2016, while for the interest + dividends variable is available from 2001 to
2016. The exact definitions of these variables are given in the Appendix.
(a) Investment income (b) Interest + dividends
Networks Respondents Networks Respondents
Year Count Count Mean Count Count Mean
2001 - - - 112 475 0.23
2002 - - - 72 315 0.17
2003 - - - 79 334 0.22
2004 - - - 75 327 0.15
2005 - - - 68 273 0.15
2006 - - - 85 369 0.19
2007 - - - 75 318 0.14
2008 - - - 68 289 0.18
2009 - - - 54 242 0.14
2011 175 820 0.27 130 593 0.19
2012 145 619 0.21 97 394 0.15
2013 123 547 0.29 86 360 0.25
2014 115 495 0.23 77 322 0.16
2015 95 410 0.29 64 261 0.16
2016 76 329 0.28 51 207 0.24
142
Table 3.3
Individual and household-level summary statistics
This table reports the sample summary statistics. Panel (a) shows the statistics
for the sample derived from the investment income indicator, while Panel (b)
shows those derived from the interest + dividend indicator. Variable definitions
are reported in the Appendix.
(a) Investment income (b) Interest + dividends
Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max.
Investment income 0.26 0.44 0 1 - - - -
Interest + dividends - - - - 0.18 0.39 0 1
Age 34.07 15.14 16 94 32.93 14.51 15 96
A-level 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.29 0.45 0 1
Degree 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.17 0.38 0 1
GCSE 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1
No qual 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.10 0.31 0 1
Other qual 0.08 0.26 0 1 0.10 0.30 0 1
Other higher qual 0.10 0.31 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1
Labour income (1000s) 1.15 1.37 0 15 1.00 1.10 0 15
Employment 0.66 0.47 0 1 0.65 0.48 0 1
Family or home 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.06 0.23 0 1
Other occupation 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1
Retired 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.03 0.17 0 1
Sick or disabled 0.02 0.15 0 1 0.04 0.18 0 1
Children 0.23 0.58 0 5 0.29 0.65 0 5
Female 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.52 0.50 0 1
Male 0.49 0.50 0 1 0.48 0.50 0 1
Year 22.01 1.67 20 25 17.15 4.67 10 25
East Midlands 0.11 0.09 0 1 0.09 0.08 0 1
East of England 0.09 0.08 0 1 0.07 0.07 0 1
London 0.07 0.07 0 1 0.06 0.05 0 1
North East 0.05 0.05 0 1 0.04 0.04 0 1
North West 0.10 0.09 0 1 0.09 0.08 0 1
Northern Ireland 0.03 0.03 0 1 0.06 0.06 0 1
Scotland 0.05 0.05 0 1 0.12 0.10 0 1
South East 0.12 0.11 0 1 0.11 0.10 0 1
South West 0.09 0.08 0 1 0.07 0.07 0 1
Wales 0.07 0.06 0 1 0.12 0.11 0 1
West Midlands 0.10 0.09 0 1 0.08 0.07 0 1
Yorkshire 0.13 0.11 0 1 0.08 0.08 0 1
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Table 3.4
Estimation results for investment income models
This table reports the estimation results for the outcome equation (Panel A) and
selection equation (Panel B) for the model in which the investment income in-
dicator is the dependent variable. Definitions of all the variables are reported in
Appendix A. The point estimates denote the mean of the respective marginal pos-
terior distribution, while the corresponding standard deviations are reported in
brackets. The stars ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote level of significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent,
respectively.





Indivual Peers Individual Peers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peer effect (λ) 0.058*** 0.055***
(0.019) (0.02)
Age 0.717*** 0.056 0.717*** 0.055
(0.08) (0.19) (0.08) (0.19)
No. of children -0.308*** -0.167 -0.310*** -0.168
(0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11)
Labour income 0.487*** 0.093 0.490*** 0.097
(0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11)
Employed 0.041 -0.153 0.040 -0.153
(0.19) (0.25) (0.19) (0.25)
Retired 0.500** 0.021 0.505** 0.024
(0.25) (0.11) (0.25) (0.11)
Sick or disabled -0.363 -0.157 -0.368 -0.156
(0.31) (0.12) (0.32) (0.12)
Other job status 0.039 -0.186 0.041 -0.186
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Degree 0.664*** 0.400** 0.661*** 0.400**
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
GCSE 0.285* 0.101 0.282* 0.099
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
A-level 0.437*** 0.397** 0.438*** 0.398**
(0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18)
Higher degree 0.639*** 0.214* 0.635*** 0.210*
(0.18) (0.12) (0.18) (0.12)
Other education 0.187 0.090 0.185 0.088
(0.18) (0.11) (0.18) (0.11)
Male 0.114 -0.099 0.114 -0.100
(0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11)
Selection equation No Yes
Year effects Yes Yes
Region effects Yes Yes













Difference in age - -2.006***
(0.25)
Difference in no. of children - -1.933***
(0.24)
Difference in personal income - -0.736***
(0.20)
Same occupational status - 0.089
(0.22)
Same education - 0.547**
(0.22)










Estimation results for interest + dividends models
This table reports the estimation results for the outcome equation (Panel A) and
selection equation (Panel B) for the model in which the interest + dividend income
indicator is the dependent variable. Definitions of all the variables are reported
in Appendix A. The point estimates denote the mean of the respective marginal
posterior distribution, while the corresponding standard deviations are reported
in brackets. The stars ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote level of significance at 1, 5 and 10
percent, respectively.





Indivual Peers Individual Peers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peer effect (λ) 0.085*** 0.066**
(0.01) (0.02)
Age 0.661*** 0.113 0.669*** 0.150
(0.07) (0.16) (0.07) (0.17)
No. of children -0.261*** -0.216** -0.276*** -0.232**
(0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
Labour income 0.288*** 0.106 0.297*** 0.137
(0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11)
Employed 0.087 -0.125 0.073 -0.164
(0.17) (0.21) (0.17) (0.23)
Retired 0.159 0.030 0.150 0.023
(0.23) (0.09) (0.24) (0.10)
Sick or disabled -0.446* -0.086 -0.476* -0.094
(0.25) (0.10) (0.26) (0.11)
Other job status 0.151 -0.032 0.140 -0.067
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20)
Degree 0.963*** 0.154 0.971*** 0.152
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
GCSE 0.403*** 0.053 0.408*** 0.040
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
A-level 0.771*** 0.157 0.780*** 0.148
(0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16)
Higher degree 0.855*** 0.050 0.876*** 0.061
(0.15) (0.10) (0.15) (0.10)
Other education 0.341** -0.054 0.340** -0.064
(0.14) (0.11) (0.15) (0.11)
Male 0.136** 0.051 0.136** 0.057
(0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
Selection equation No Yes
Year effects Yes Yes
Region effects Yes Yes











Difference in age - -2.240***
(0.24)
Difference in no. of children - -1.906***
(0.22)
Difference in personal income - -0.636***
(0.18)
Same occupational status - 0.525***
(0.21)
Same education - 0.615***
(0.21)













Investment income Indicator variable: value one if the respondent receives investment in-
come, and zero otherwise. Investment income includes income from
private pensions/annuities, rent from non-family boarders or lodgers,
rent from any other property, excluding tax plus income from savings
and investment.
Interest plus dividends Indicator variable: value one if the respondent receives interest or di-
vidend income, and zero otherwise.
Age Age of the respondent in years.
A-level Indicator variable: value one if the highest educational attainment of the
respondent are A-levels, and zero otherwise.
Degree Indicator variable: value one if the highest educational attainment of the
respondent is a university degree, and zero otherwise.
GCSE Indicator variable: value one if the highest educational attainment of the
respondent is the GCSE, and zero otherwise.
No qual Indicator variable: value one if the respondent holds no educational
qualifications, and zero otherwise.
Other qual Indicator variable: value one if the respondent holds other educational
qualifications, and zero otherwise.
Other higher qual Indicator variable: value one if the respondent holds other higher edu-
cational qualifications, and zero otherwise.
Labour income Gross monthly labour income of the respondent.
Employment Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is an employee or self-
employed, working full-time or part-time, and zero otherwise.
Family or home Indicator variable: value one if the respondent looks after his/her family
or home as a main occupation, and zero otherwise.
Other occupation Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is not in employment,
retired, sick or disabled or looks after family/home, and zero otherwise.
Retired Indicator variable: value one if the respondent looks after his/her family
or home as a main occupation, and zero otherwise.
Sick or disabled Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is sick or disabled, and
zero otherwise.
Children Number of children of the respondent.
Female Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is female, and zero oth-
erwise.
Male Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is male, and zero other-
wise.
East Midlands Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is domiciled in the Gov-
ernmental Office Region East Midlands, and zero otherwise.
East of England Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is domiciled in Govern-
mental Office Region East of England, and zero otherwise.
London Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is domiciled in Govern-




North East Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is domiciled in Govern-
mental Office Region North East, and zero otherwise.
North West Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is domiciled in Govern-
mental Office Region North West, and zero otherwise.
Northern Ireland Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is domiciled in Govern-
mental Office Region Northern Ireland, and zero otherwise.
Scotland Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is domiciled in Govern-
mental Office Region Scotland, and zero otherwise.
South East Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is domiciled in Govern-
mental Office Region South East, and zero otherwise.
South West Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is domiciled in Govern-
mental Office Region South West, and zero otherwise.
Wales Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is domiciled in Govern-
mental Office Region Wales, and zero otherwise.
West Midlands Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is domiciled in Govern-
mental Office Region West Midlands, and zero otherwise.
Yorkshire and the Humber Indicator variable: value one if the respondent is domiciled in Govern-
mental Office Region Yorkshire and the Humber, and zero otherwise.
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Conclusion
This thesis set out to empirically analyse the relationship between financial literacy
and subjective well-being (first essay), the relation between social norm enforce-
ment and mental health (second essay) and the endogenous choice of peers with
respect to investment participation (third essay). A multitude of observations
emerges from these analyses.
In the first essay, we began by establishing that financial distress is associated
with an approximately 13% drop in aggregate subjective well-being against pre-
dicted population-wide levels. Crucially, the analysis revealed that the relationship
between financial distress and subjective well-being intensifies those individuals
with high financial knowledge levels. For these individuals, financial distress is
associated with a drop of 18% in aggregate subjective well-being, against relative
to predicted overall levels. The stability of the relationship was confirmed for the
individual subjective well-being dimensions.
Speaking to the driver of the observed relationship, the analysis revealed that
when high financial knowledge individuals report that they fail to follow through
with their own financial goals, the relationship intensifies disproportionately in-
tensifies, yielding an estimated drop of 35% in aggregate subjective well-being. As
we controlled for a wide range of individual- and household-level characteristics,
this association suggests that high financial knowledge individuals have higher fin-
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ancial aspirations and again, the associations were confirmed for the individual
subjective well-being dimensions.
In a set of additional analyses, we confirmed the conclusions drawn in an instru-
mental variable approach, and also found that relationships are stable when only
the sample of financially distressed individuals is considered. These individuals
are more likely to engage with financial education programmes aimed at individu-
als in difficult financial situations, which indicates that financial educators might
find value in considering what effects erosions in subjective well-being might have
on the extent of participants motivations to improve their circumstances.
In the second essay, we found that high welfarism, defined as favourable atti-
tudes towards the welfare state and benefit recipients, is associated with an in-
creased prevalence of mental health problem of 13 percentage points, a 39% in-
crease against predicted population-wide levels. We formulated the hypothesis
that expressing high welfarism constitutes a deviation of work norms, resulting in
sanctioning and associated decreases in mental health.
We tested the notion by investigating the changes to the magnitudes of the rela-
tionship under Conservative governments, known to be tougher on welfare. The
analysis revealed an intensifying of the relationship relative to Labour govern-
ments. Further, we found that the relationship is stronger for employed individu-
als, which exhibit high conformity with work norms, relative to those not in em-
ployment, with low conformity, suggesting that in-group social norms deviations
are sanctioned more severely.
Additional analysis revealed that the observed relationships are stronger for fe-
males than for males. Further, we found that the combination of high welfarism
and mental health problems is associated with more favourable attitudes towards
voting, suggesting increased motivations to induce social change.
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In the third essay, we proposed a peer effects model for binary outcome variables
that explicitly models the empirical regularity that relationship formations occur
on the basis of individuals similarities with one another. We use household net-
works that we obtain from the UK’s major longitudinal surveys, Understanding
Society and the British Household Panel Surveys (BHPS). Estimation took place
in a Bayesian econometric framework using Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampling
methods.
We estimated the model on data for two outcomes variables: a general investment
income indicator variable and an interest + dividend income indicator variable.
We fit models both with exogenous and endogenous relationship formations. The
resulting model comparison revealed that endogenous peer choice accounts for
approximately 25% of the peer effect in investment participation. We further
investigated the economic implications of low participation rates in the UK pop-
ulation in a simulation exercise, restricting the peer effect to zero. We produced
counter-factual individual investment participation outcomes. The exercise sug-
gested that participation rates would be 7% to 10% higher in the absence of peer
effects.
A limitation that all three essays share as a result of data limitations is that
identification of the results is derived from the cross-section of respondents in the
samples. While all empirical analyses carefully control for factors that can con-
stitute confounding influences to the observed relationships and employ measures
to overcome causal identification challenges, future work building on these essays
could exploit time-ordered data to examine changes that play out over time, if they
becomes available, or test for the presence of causal effects bespoke randomised
controls, where appropriate.
Overall, this thesis highlights three implications for the consideration of policy-
makers. First, policymakers should consider that financial aspirations can play
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an important role in the success of individuals enrolling in public financial edu-
cation programmes. The higher financial aspirations, the more strongly financial
distress can be experienced; and the resulting possible deterioration in subjective
well-being may put educational success on the road to financial recovery at risk.
Second, our results suggest the need for public discourse less loaded with stigmatiz-
ation of the welfare state and benefit recipients due to its arguably identity-shaping
effects and consequent social sanctioning. As the sanctioning of perceived devi-
ations from work norms, through expressions of positive welfare attitudes, can put
mental health at risk, changes to political rhetoric may contribute to population-
wide improvements in mental health outcomes. Third, our results suggest a role
for policy interventions that promote the known benefits of investment particip-
ation for the long-term economic well-being of household in the cross-section of
society that holds no investments. Such policy efforts may facilitate the breaking
up of possible self-sustaining tendencies of not participating in financial markets
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